fmpВестник Московского Университета. Серия XXV. Международные отношения и мировая политикаLomonosov World Politics Journal2076-7404Московский государственный университет имени М.В.Ломоносова10.48015/2076-7404-2020-12-3-131-164fmp-52Research ArticleУ ИСТОКОВ БИПОЛЯРНОГО ПОРЯДКА: УРОКИ ВТОРОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЫTHE ORIGINS OF THE BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER: LESSONS OF WORLD WAR IIФормирование американских планов послевоенного обустройства Японии в годы Второй мировой войныDevelopment of the US Plans for Post-War Japan during World War IIСидоровА. А.SidorovA. A.

Сидоров Андрей Анатольевич — кандидат исторических наук, доцент, декан факультета мировой политики, заведующий кафедрой международных организаций и мировых политических процессов ФМП

119991, Москва, Ленинские горы, 1

Andrey A. Sidorov — PhD (History), Associate Professor, Dean of the School of World Politics, Head of the Chair of International Organizations and World Political Processes, School of World Politics

1 Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991

aas@fmp.msu.ruФедеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Московский государственный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова»Lomonosov Moscow State University202020112020123131164Copyright © Сидоров А.А., 20202020Сидоров А.А.Sidorov A.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://fmp.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/52

Подписание «Акта о безоговорочной капитуляции Японии» 2 сентября 1945 г. подвело формальный итог самой разрушительной и кровопролитной войны в истории человечества. Еще до этого события начала формироваться новая расстановка сил на международной арене, просуществовавшая почти полвека. При этом сразу стало очевидно, что союзники по антигитлеровской коалиции имеют разные представления о том, каким должен стать мир после войны. Традиционно и в отечественной, и в зарубежной академической литературе особое внимание в этой связи уделяется комплексу проблем, связанных с решением судьбы побежденной Германии. В данной статье предполагается дать краткий обзор процесса выработки рекомендаций по переустройству Японии, проходившего под эгидой Государственного департамента США в 1939–1945 гг. и ставшего исходным пунктом формирования так называемой Сан-Францисской подсистемы международных отношений. В первой части статьи обозначены трудности, с которыми столкнулось руководство американского внешнеполитического ведомства, когда встала задача разработки планов послевоенного устройства Дальнего Востока. К числу таких проблем автор относит прежде всего острый дефицит подготовленных кадров, который в итоге вынудил Госдепартамент использовать свои связи с частными исследовательскими организациями и привлечь их к долгосрочному планированию. Автор отмечает, что если до вступления США в войну американские планировщики придерживались достаточно жестких позиций в отношении Японии, то после Перл-Харбора ситуация парадоксальным образом изменилась. Во второй части статьи подробно рассмотрены противоречия между теми политиками и экспертами, которые считали, что при формировании послевоенного порядка на Дальнем Востоке следует прежде всего сотрудничать с Китаем, и теми, кто продвигал идею налаживания отношений с Японией. Эти группы получили неофициальные названия «китайская команда» и «японская толпа» соответственно. В статье показано, что по мере приближения окончания войны отмеченные противоречия постепенно отходили на второй план, а на первый выступали задачи развития межведомственного взаимодействия, выработки Государственным департаментом, Военным и Военно-морским министерствами согласованной позиции в отношении будущего Японии. Результатом этой работы стала серия меморандумов, которые заложили основу всей послевоенной политики США применительно к Японии. Подводя итог проведенному анализу процесса принятия стратегических решений в Вашингтоне в военное время, автор обращает внимание на его планомерность, тщательность и гибкость. Результатом стало, казалось, невозможное: из ярого противника Соединенных Штатов на Тихом океане Япония превратилась в их самого надежного союзника, каковым остается до настоящего времени.

Signing of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 1945 had formally ended the most destructive and bloody war in the history of mankind. Even before that a new balance of power on the international arena began to form, that would persist for almost half a century. At the same time, it was obvious from the outright that the Allies had very different views on how the post-war world order should look like. Traditionally, both Russian and foreign academic literature focused on their disputes regarding the German question. This paper provides a brief overview of the US Department of State planning and recommendation process for the post-war reconstruction of Japan in 1939–1945, which had eventually led to the formation of the socalled San Francisco subsystem of international relations. The first section of the paper outlines the challenges faced by the State Department when it came to planning the post-war architecture of the Far East. In that regard, the author pays particular attention to the staff shortage, which forced the Department of State to strengthen partnership with private research organizations and involve them in long-term planning.

The author emphasizes that if before the United States entered the war the US planners adopted a rather tough stance on Japan, after the attack on Pearl Harbor their approaches paradoxically changed. The second section examines the contradictions and tensions between those politicians and experts who believed that in the establishment of the post-war order in the Far East the US should cooperate with China, and those who promoted rapprochement with Japan. These groups were unofficially referred to as the ‘Chinese team’ and the ‘Japanese crowd’ accordingly. The paper shows that as the end of the war approached, these contradictions gradually faded into the background. The needs to promote the interdepartmental cooperation and to reconcile the positions of the State Department, the Military and Naval Ministries on the future of Japan came to the fore. This work resulted in a series of memoranda, which laid the foundation for the US post-war policy towards Japan. In conclusion the author provides a general assessment of the strategic decision-making process in the United States during wartime and emphasizes its consistency, thoroughness and flexibility. As a result, it enabled the US to achieve what seemed impossible: to turn Japan from an ardent adversary of the United States in the Pacific into one of its most reliable allies, and it remains such today.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.