fmpВестник Московского Университета. Серия XXV. Международные отношения и мировая политикаLomonosov World Politics Journal2076-7404Московский государственный университет имени М.В.Ломоносоваfmp-66Research ArticleМЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬINTERNATIONAL SECURITYСмена «ядерных веков»: стратегическая стабильность и контуры нового мирового порядкаAt the Turn of the Nuclear Ages: Strategic Stability and Contours of a New World OrderВеселовВ. А.VeselovV. A.

Веселов Василий Александрович – старший преподаватель факультета мировой политики   

119991, Москва, Ленинские горы, 1

Vasilii A. Veselov – Senior Lecturer, School of World Politics 

1 Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991

vves@fmp.msu.ruФедеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Московский государственный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова»РоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation201826112020101102141Copyright © Московский государственный университет имени М.В.Ломоносова, 20202020Московский государственный университет имени М.В.ЛомоносоваМосковский государственный университет имени М.В.Ломоносоваhttps://fmp.elpub.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://fmp.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/66

2018 год богат на знаменательные юбилеи. В контексте развития современных международных отношений особую актуальность, безусловно, приобретает 50-летие Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия. Однако с точки зрения оценки перспектив поддержания стратегической стабильности, роли ядерного оружия в мировой политике и, шире, определения и понимания контуров нового мирового порядка как минимум не меньшее значение имеет еще один юбилей – 20-летие «второго ядерного века». Для того чтобы выявить ключевые содержательные характеристики этого феномена, в рамках данной статьи предпринята попытка сравнительного анализа отличительных черт и особенностей обоих «ядерных веков». Автор подробно освещает причины и предпосылки вступления международных отношений в «первый ядерный век», на основе изучения американских доктринальных документов и аналитических материалов прослеживает эволюцию ядерной стратегии США и их подходов к проблемам сдерживания и определения политических целей войны. Особое внимание в этой связи уделено складыванию стратегического паритета между СССР и США, роли соглашения ОСВ-1 и Договора по ПРО в выработке представлений о стратегической стабильности и становлении неформального «кодекса поведения» ядерных держав. В статье отмечается, что «первый ядерный век» хронологически совпадает с «холодной войной», но эти явления не тождественны. В качестве начала отсчета «второго ядерного века» предлагается рассматривать такие события, как вступление в «ядерный клуб» Индии и Пакистана, проведение испытаний баллистических ракет большой дальности в КНДР и пересмотр политики в отношении противоракетной обороны в США, приведший вскоре к их выходу из Договора по ПРО 1972 г. Автор заключает, что к числу ключевых особенностей «второго ядерного века» следует отнести сохранение «центрального сдерживания» при одновременном возрастании роли и значения новых политических конфигураций с участием ядерных и неядерных государств, многие из которых имеют весьма специфические подходы к формулированию своей военной политики и стратегических установок. В совокупности эти факторы составляют основу системы военно-политического взаимодействия ведущих государств мира в условиях формирующегося нового мирового порядка.

The year 2018 is rich with anniversaries. In the current international context the 50th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is certainly having special relevance. However, in the view of the need to examine the prospects of ensuring strategic stability, the role of nuclear weapons in world politics and the contours of the new world order yet another anniversary – twenty years from the beginning of the ‘second nuclear age’ – is just as important. In order to identify the substantive aspects of this phenomenon this paper provides a comparative analysis of distinctive features of both the first and the second nuclear ages. The author identifies the causes and prerequisites for the beginning of the ‘first nuclear age’ and examines, on the basis of a wide range of policy papers and analytical reports, the evolution of the United States’ approaches to nuclear strategy, deterrence and military and political goal setting. Special focus is on such issues as the achievement of strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States and the role of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the development of the concept of strategic stability and informal code of conduct of nuclear powers. The paper emphasizes that although the ‘first nuclear age’ coincides chronologically with the Cold War, these two phenomena are not identical. As for the ‘second nuclear age’, the author links its emergence with such developments as India and Pakistan joining the nuclear ‘club’, long-range missile tests carried out by the DPRK, and the revision of the U.S. policy regarding the anti-missile defense which led to the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The author concludes that defining characteristics of the ‘second nuclear age’ include the retention of the ‘central deterrence’ accompanied by a growing importance of new political formats involving both nuclear and non-nuclear states, many of which have culturally specific approaches to military policy and strategic planning. All these factors combined form a backbone of military and political interactions between the leading powers within the emerging world order.

«второй ядерный век»ядерное сдерживаниестратегическая стабильностьвзаимное гарантированное уничтожение«холодная война»«ядерный клуб»гибкое реагированиемеждународная безопасностьмировой порядоксистема международных отношенийДоговор о нераспространении ядерного оружия‘second nuclear age’nuclear deterrencestrategic stabilitymutually assured destructionthe Cold Warnuclear ‘club’flexible responseinternational securityworld orderinternational systemNuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyИсследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке Российского фонда фундаментальных исследований в рамках научного проекта № 15-37-11136.This work has been accomplished with financial support from the RFBR, research project № 15-37-11136.ReferencesБроди Б. Стратегия в век ракетного оружия. М.: Воениздат, 1961.Brodie B. 1961. Strategy in the missile age. Princeton, Princeton University Press [Russ. ed.: Brodi B. 1961. Strategiya v vek raketnogo oruzhiya. 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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.