The article addresses the disputed issue of whether sanctions studies constitute an independent research field within political science or whether their function is confined to a set of utilitarian solutions that do not transcend middle-range theories. The author summarizes the key arguments that form the basis of an indirect professional discussion on the topic. On the basis of the English-language body of specialized literature, the article covers the linguistic, theoretical-methodological, and institutional aspects of the issue. Special attention is paid to the conceptualization of sanction studies in the Russian academic discourse. The author notes that a key advantage of the Russian approach lies in its reliance on the methodological component, particularly the development of several databases adapted to the nuances of the national sanctions framework and aimed at producing a unique output that surpasses the limitations of foreign counterparts. The author argues that there is potential for the formation of a distinctive Russian school of sanctions studies; however, due to a late start and the largely reactive nature of reflections on this issue, it will not occur quickly. The author concludes that expertise in the field of economic sanctions represents a distinct area of study, marked by practical relevance and a relatively low level of institutionalization within the established framework of academic research. Consequently, the article suggests legitimizing the ‘sanctions studies’ concept within the discourse on relevant issues.

Currently, various restrictive measures are among the most actively used tools in the arsenal of leading actors in world politics. The countries of the Global South are both the object and, increasingly, the subject of their application. The most notable examples are the states that form the core of the BRICS. This article identifies the key features of the multidimensional discourse on sanctions within this informal association. The first section examines the attitude of key BRICS member countries towards the use of unilateral and international sanctions, which is then projected onto the level of the entire association, largely determining its agenda in this sphere. As shown, while still officially condemning the practice of unilateral restrictive measures, a number of BRICS countries are increasingly employing various autonomous restrictions: typically informal sanctions (sanctions under other names), but in recent years more and more often formal ones as well. The second section identifies the key elements of the discourse on sanctions within BRICS as a whole. According to the author, one of its most important narratives is the idea of the unacceptably high ‘collateral damage’ inflicted by sanctions on the target state’s population, as well as on third countries, particularly developing ones. The third section examines new trends in the approaches of BRICS members to sanctions amidst the expanded use of secondary restrictions by Western actors in recent years and the Trump administration’s rise to power in the United States, which intensified pressure on the BRICS countries. The author concludes that although this pressure could stimulate the development of a coordinated policy among the BRICS countries aimed at minimizing damage from sanctions, as of today, there is no indication that the association is ready to speak with one voice against Western unilateral sanctions, let alone directly counter them. Nevertheless, even this moderate BRICS position on sanctions contributes to advancing and strengthening the discourse on the need to form a new, more just, polycentric world order.

In recent years, Russian foreign policy and economic activity have been reorienting eastward, which has a noticeable impact not only on the Asian region, but also on the world politics as a whole. This article traces the key effects of Russia’s ‘pivot to the East’ policy on international relations. The first section assesses the consequences of Russia’s new foreign policy course for the Asian region. In this context, the author highlights the intensification of Russian diplomacy within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as in the promotion of large-scale projects such as the ‘East–West’ and ‘North–South’ international transport corridors, the Northern Sea Route, and the ‘Power of Siberia 2’ gas pipeline. The second section examines the implications of the Russia-China rapprochement for international relations. Specifically, the author emphasizes that the forging of a strategic alliance between Russia and the People’s Republic of China has provided impetus for both the strengthening of existing non-Western multilateral cooperation formats, including BRICS and the SCO, and the development of new macro-regional projects such as the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The article concludes that the international relations system is transitioning toward a ‘Cold War 2.0’ model, in which the stagnating Western camp led by the United States will be counterbalanced by a dynamically developing Global South.

The deglobalization phenomenon, which just a decade ago was perceived as a marginal hypothesis or a concept of anti-globalist discourse, has by the mid-2020s become both a dominant trend in the development of the global economy and a subject of intense scholarly debate. Of particular interest in this context is the analysis of how this trend manifests itself in the Asia-Pacific amid the intensifying confrontation between the world’s two leading economies — i.e., the People’s Republic of China and the United States. In this article, the author seeks to answer the question of whether the rivalry between the PRC and the United States will lead to the emergence of a new global development model, or whether the tendency toward further, albeit regulated, fragmentation will prevail in the world economy. Specifically, the article demonstrates that the Asia-Pacific, where the United States and the PRC are advancing competing regional integration projects, experiences not so much a movement toward the ‘greater integration’ as the proliferation of concurrent structures that tend to delineate the economic space into opposing blocs rather than facilitate its unification. Under these conditions, regional powers increasingly prioritize considerations of security, resilience, and sovereignty over pure economic efficiency, with smaller states engaging in maneuvering between the Chinese and American economic blocs. In this context, the policy of techno-nationalism is also becoming widespread. The author examines the development of the technological race between the PRC and the United States, which leads to the deepening of fault lines within the global economy and the formation of insulated technological clusters. Drawing on the analysis of these trends, the author formulates four scenarios for the development of the global economy, none of which, however, has been fully realized so far. In this regard, the article concludes that the current stage in the development of the world economic system can be described by the term ‘post-globalism’, which refers to a situation in which the old models of the global economy have lost their appeal, while new ones have not yet taken shape. As such, post-globalism harbors new threats but also opens up new opportunities for states, especially those of the Global South. However, to take advantage of these opportunities, internal consolidation and the ability to articulate a distinct vision of the future are necessary.

The globalization model that took its shape in the second half of the 20th century is currently in a deep crisis, vividly manifested in the increasing fragmentation of the previously integrated economic space. Under these conditions, the leading actors in international relations are revising their economic policies, prioritizing security considerations over efficiency and seeking to tailor regional economic orders to their own needs. This trend is most pronounced in the Asia-Pacific, where competition between several models of regional integration is unfolding, effectively serving as a testing ground for one of the potential formats of the future world order. In this context, the rivalry between the integration models advanced by the United States and the People’s Republic of China, as the two principal centers of economic gravity in the region, comes to the fore. The U.S. economic strategy is subordinated to the goal of securing regional dominance; a pursuit that, amid the crisis of the neoliberal globalization model, is increasingly becoming an anachronism. China’s integration projects, by contrast, are aimed not so much at establishing regional hegemony as at building an economic architecture that would protect China from a recurrence of the ‘century of humiliation’. At the same time, the author argues that the main obstacle to the implementation of China’s strategy in the Asia-Pacific may lie not in trade and technological sanctions or military-political pressure from Western states, but rather in the structural problems of the PRC’s economy. The Sino-American economic confrontation poses new challenges to regional players while simultaneously opening up new opportunities for pursuing independent policies. In this regard, Japan’s strategy of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific merits particular attention; it can be regarded as a carefully calibrated and well-calculated attempt by Tokyo to occupy the niche of a normative, and perhaps also infrastructural, bridge between the competing centers of power. Finally, the policies of the ASEAN member states are of particular interest: by employing multi-vector diplomacy to build linkages among various integration frameworks, they benefit from the competition between them and carve out additional room for maneuver. In general, although the new multipolar world order is still in the making, the case of the Asia-Pacific already demonstrates that it will differ markedly from previous historical analogues in its considerably greater complexity and interdependence.

The beginning of the 21st century has been marked by the rapid strengthening of the PRC’s international political standing, as China increasingly asserts itself as a great power with global ambitions. This trend vividly manifests itself in the swift growth of China’s political and economic clout in virtually all regions of the world. One such region is the Middle East, which, due to its strategic location and vast resource base, is becoming increasingly important for Chinese diplomacy. This study attempts to identify the distinctive features of the PRC’s foreign policy in the Middle East amid the transformation of China’s global positioning on the international stage, as well as to outline the factors that facilitate or, conversely, impede the implementation of Beijing’s objectives in this area. The author traces the evolution of the PRC’s approaches to Middle Eastern affairs from limited diplomatic contacts during the early Cold War period to its emergence as a key trade and investment partner for all countries in the region. Particular attention is paid to the PRC’s current foreign policy in the Middle East, set against the back-drop of a series of global initiatives launched by Xi Jinping. The author identifies the key challenges and problems confronting the implementation of the PRC’s policy in the Middle East and highlights the serious dilemma facing Chinese diplomacy. On the one hand, the PRC’s consistent reliance on the principles of multilateralism and non-interference, reinforced by large-scale trade, economic, and infrastructure initiatives, resonates widely with local elites, fostering strategic trust in China, which may enable it to further strengthen its regional position in the future. On the other hand, amid growing conflict in the Middle East, the limits of such a policy course are becoming apparent: the PRC’s partners expect it to provide more active support, including military and political backing, and to participate more directly in ensuring regional peace and stability. The author concludes that the future of China’s Middle East policy will directly depend on its ability to balance economic interests and strategic imperatives.

On June 3, 2025, Lee Jae-myung, a representative of the Democratic Party, was elected as the new President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in a snap presidential election. Unlike his pro-American predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, he pledged to pursue a balanced foreign policy aligned with the country’s national interests. However, the newly elected head of state, in many respects, actually continues his predecessor’s course. This inevitably raises the question of what accounts for such continuity and how it may affect the ROK’s foreign policy amid mounting international tensions. To address this question, the article first provides a detailed description of Lee Jae-myung’s political profile and identifies the persistent determinants currently shaping the substance and principal directions of the ROK’s foreign policy. According to the author, these determinants include global turbulence, intensifying Sino-American rivalry, the ‘Trump phenomenon’, the dynamics of relations between the DPRK, the PRC, and Russia, as well as the domestic political situation in South Korea. On this basis, the author examines Lee Jae-myung’s initial steps in relations with the United States, the PRC, Russia, Japan, and the DPRK and outlines possible scenarios for the development of the ROK’s interactions with these countries. The author concludes that, despite populist rhetoric, the new president will continue his predecessor’s foreign policy, which entails strengthening friendly relations with Washington and distancing from both U.S. rivals — China and Russia — and the DPRK within the frame-work of inter-Korean dialogue. This trajectory is determined not so much by the personal views of the populist Lee Jae-myung as by objective macro-regional trends that significantly constrain the ROK’s political leeway.

This review focuses on a new collective monograph published in 2025 and edited by Kirill V. Babaev, Director of the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Drawing from his own practical experience in fostering Sino-Russian relations during his tenure as the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, later as the State Military Inspector — Secretary of the Defense Council, and then as the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the reviewer assesses the findings and observations reached by the authors of the given monograph. The reviewer emphasizes that, while the contributors focus on the specific features of the contemporary Chinese ideology, their work in fact encompasses a broader scope of issues, including the development of the PRC’s state and legal system, its economic and foreign policies, and military posture. The authors pay special attention to the activities of the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Chinese President Xi Jinping. As for the actual assessments of China’s modern ideology, the reviewer notes that, according to the authors, it represents a creative blend of traditional norms (rooted in the ideas of Confucius), the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and the latest modernization concepts, particularly those related to the extensive and multifaceted introduction of advanced technologies and sustainability practices. Consequently, the PRC’s state and party leadership combines a high level of ideologization with a distinctly pragmatic approach in the economic, social, scientific, technical, and military spheres, thus preventing the dogmatization of the country’s ideological policy. The reviewer concludes that, in the context of the active development of Russian-Chinese relations, the promotion of a better understanding of China among non-Sinologists is a major task for the scientific community, for political practitioners, and for Russian society as a whole. In this regard, the book is of great interest not only to the IR experts, but to a wide range of readers.