The changes currently unfolding in international relations have become the subject of intense scholarly debate. One of the central questions concerns how these changes should be interpreted: as manifestations of a qualitative transformation of the world political system as a whole, or as yet another shift in the balance of power within its existing framework. At the same time, the very concept of development remains surprisingly understudied in International Relations (IR) theory. As a critical review of the major approaches in contemporary IR theory — including neorealism, liberal institutionalism, synergetics, constructivism, critical theory, world-systems analysis, the transcendent approach, and the English School — demonstrates, none offers an operationalizable criterion for distinguishing between the routine functioning of the international system and its development.

Drawing on dialectical methodology, existential philosophy, and emergence theory, the author formulates the concept of the transcendence of the new, which describes a form of systemic change whereby the system transcends its own causal constraints and generates content that is ontologically irreducible to its previous state. The explanatory potential of this concept is then illustrated through the emergence of international law as a fundamentally new element of the international system. To demonstrate the heuristic value of the proposed concept in explaining qualitative changes in the legal regulation of relations among actors within the international system, the author compares it with alternative interpretations derived from realism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism, critical-genealogical approaches, and the English School. Particular attention is devoted to applying the concept of the transcendence of the new to an assessment of the contemporary state of international law. The author argues that, while international law continues to reproduce the logic of the existing international system, its post-Second World War institutional form is undergoing a crisis as it gradually gives way to a more polycentric configuration. In conclusion, the author maintains that the proposed interpretation of the category of development is not intended to be universal but may stimulate further philosophical reflection on this phenomenon within IR theory.

In recent years, Italy has witnessed a resurgence of nationalist sentiment characterized by appeals to national greatness, the image of a ‘humiliated’ nation, and the need to ‘restore justice’. In this context, the rise to power of the Fratelli d’Italia party in 2022, whose program combines elements of right-wing populism with the legacy of the neo-fascist movement, is particularly noteworthy. However, similar trends, in which nationalist, chauvinistic, and imperial narratives serve as the basis for constructing new political myths, are currently unfolding far beyond Italy. From this perspective, the Italian case allows for broader generalizations by identifying key cultural features that make right-wing populist discourse appealing to a significant segment of contemporary society. This article traces the evolution of the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Italy between 1861 and 1945 through the lens of the concept of strategic culture, demonstrating how enduring patterns in elite perceptions of the historical past influence contemporary foreign policy decision-making. The first section defines the concept of strategic culture and assesses its analytical potential from the perspective of international relations theory and foreign policy practice. The second section traces the evolution of the Kingdom of Italy’s strategic culture from the Risorgimento to the establishment of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist regime. It shows how the irredentist narrative of the gradual unification of Italian lands evolved into a nationalist doctrine of territorial expansion, which became a central element of the country’s strategic culture. The third section identifies the defining features of Italian strategic culture under the Fascist dictatorship. It argues that the myth of imperial grandeur employed by the Fascist regime in constructing national identity conflicted with the country’s actual capabilities, which were insufficient to sustain an expansionist foreign policy. The author concludes that a strategic culture that fails to take account of the state’s objective interests can become a destructive factor, hindering a realistic assessment of national goals and policy priorities. Furthermore, the author argues that the legacy of fascism has not been fully addressed by Italian society or its political elites, making the debate over whether contemporary Italy might repeat the mistakes of the past all the more relevant.

From 1973 to the present, Afghanistan has experienced continuous political upheaval, coups, and armed conflict, exacerbated by external intervention. The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 did not fundamentally reverse these trends, with Afghanistan remaining a source of regional and international instability. In this context, the political settlement strategy developed during the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan merits particular attention. This article traces the evolution of the Soviet Union’s strategy for resolving the intra-Afghan conflict. It demonstrates how, as political instability within Afghanistan intensified, the USSR gradually shifted from providing economic and technical assistance to the Afghan government to the direct use of military force against the opposition. The article also examines the circumstances surrounding the Soviet leadership’s decision to deploy a limited military contingent to Afghanistan. It argues that this decision, taken despite warnings from military leaders and the armed forces’ objective lack of preparedness for combat operations in unfamiliar terrain, only worsened the situation within Afghanistan and damaged the Soviet Union’s international standing. Influenced by these factors, as well as by Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power, the Soviet leadership recognized by the mid-1980s the futility of pursuing a military solution and was compelled to develop a phased strategy for political settlement. This ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the implementation of which is examined in detail in the final section. The author argues that the Soviet strategy contained an inherent contradiction: Moscow sought to achieve a political settlement and establish a stable and legitimate Afghan state through the large-scale use of military force. In this respect, the Soviet experience demonstrates that even a state possessing technologically advanced armed forces cannot necessarily secure victory in an asymmetric war against irregular forces supported by the local population. The study of this experience remains important for understanding the relationship between military force and political settlement in the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts.

Illegal drug production in Afghanistan constitutes not only a national problem but also a serious threat to regional and international security. Despite this, its origins remain relatively understudied. This article aims to identify the complex interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors that contributed to the emergence and expansion of illicit drug production in Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s. The first section analyzes the socio-economic conditions that laid the groundwork for the spread of the drug trade in Afghanistan on the eve of the civil war. It argues that the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector, the archaic system of land tenure, and rising rural poverty increased the attractiveness of illicit sources of income compared with legal but low-yield forms of livelihood. The second section demonstrates how the intensification of domestic political conflict and the weakening of central state institutions gradually led to the expansion of the shadow economy and the decline of the agricultural sector, thereby fostering the growth of the drug industry. The third section examines developments in the international illicit drug market. It argues that the expansion of drug production in Afghanistan was facilitated by the spread of illicit trafficking networks in Pakistan, rising demand for opiates in Western countries, and shortages resulting from declining supplies from Iran and Southeast Asia. The author concludes that the escalation of the political crisis in Afghanistan, together with the deployment of the limited Soviet military contingent, should be regarded not as the primary cause of the expansion of the drug economy but rather as a catalyst that intensified an already existing combination of adverse endogenous and exogenous trends, ultimately contributing to Afghanistan’s transformation into one of the world’s leading centers of opiate production by the 1990s.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the country has remained a source of heightened terrorist threats to other states in the region. In this context, particular attention should be paid to the terrorist organization Islamic State — Khorasan Province (ISIS–K). Although its activities are concentrated primarily in Afghanistan, they often extend beyond the country’s borders. This article aims to examine the nature of ISIS–K in the context of the threats the group poses at the national, regional, and global levels. The first section identifies the causes of the emergence of ISIS–K in Afghanistan, highlighting the inherently contradictory nature of the organization as both a transnational movement and a nationally oriented group. The second section examines how ISIS–K has adapted to the gradual weakening of its position within Afghanistan amid the consolidation of Taliban rule, as well as to changing international political conditions. In this regard, ISIS–K’s use of modern information and communication technologies, which gives the group’s terrorist activities a truly global dimension, is of particular concern. The article concludes that ISIS–K represents a glocal phenomenon, combining subversive activities within Afghanistan with transnational terrorist methods. The author argues that the complex nature of ISIS–K poses risks both to Afghanistan’s domestic political stability and, even more significantly, to regional and global security through cross-border terrorist threats that require a coordinated international response.

Upon taking office in 2025, the second Trump administration declared the Western Hemisphere its highest foreign policy priority and reaffirmed the region as an area of exclusive U.S. interest. In particular, the Panama Canal, owing to its strategic location, has become an increasingly important arena of interstate competition. This article aims to identify the key factors shaping the second Trump administration’s approach to the ‘Panama issue’ amid the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The first section examines the principal priorities and directing principles of the 47th U.S. president’s policy toward the Western Hemisphere. The author argues that this policy represents not so much a revision of the traditional U.S. approach to strengthening its influence in the region as a reinterpretation of that approach in the spirit of the America First doctrine. On the one hand, this policy has been driven by China’s rapidly expanding presence in the Panama Canal area, reflected both in the growing participation of Chinese companies in infrastructure projects on the isthmus and in Panama’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative. In this context, the situation surrounding the Panama Canal has provided the second Trump administration with an opportunity to test its reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and to demonstrate resolve through diplomatic pressure on Panama. On the other hand, the Trump administration’s hard-line approach to the Panama Canal issue can also be interpreted as an attempt to reaffirm campaign commitments to its electoral base and thereby strengthen domestic political support ahead of the midterm elections. The author concludes that the second Trump administration’s strategy regarding the Panama Canal has thus far proved effective, enabling the United States to secure what may be described as a ‘psychological’ victory in its strategic competition with China in the LAC region. At the same time, the author notes that, despite its deliberately confrontational rhetoric, the U.S. leadership has demonstrated both a willingness to recognize the objective constraints and potential costs of a more aggressive policy toward Latin American and Caribbean states and a readiness to make pragmatic concessions when necessary. In this respect, the strategy developed by the second Trump administration regarding the Panama Canal may serve as a useful model for countering Chinese influence elsewhere in the region.

Following the outbreak of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Eastern Europe has undergone a significant transformation. To better understand the nature of this shift, it is necessary to examine both its conceptual foundations and its practical implementation through a range of programs and operational activities. Particular attention is devoted to the so-called Resistance Operating Concept, according to which U.S. SOF should function not merely as combat units but also as architects of a comprehensive regional security architecture. This approach emphasizes the creation of resistance networks, the organization of rear-area support structures, and the coordination of operations in the information and cyber domains in the event that an adversary occupies the territory of a NATO ally. Against this background, the article examines the principal areas of U.S. SOF activity in Eastern Europe, including engagement with civil society, cyber, information, and psychological operations, as well as coordination among different branches of the armed forces. The author argues that the primary objective of the U.S. SOF strategy in Eastern Europe is to establish a decentralized and flexible deterrence system capable of self-organization even in the event of the disruption of key decision-making centers. The effectiveness of this system depends less on the number of military units involved than on the degree to which they are integrated into the national security and civil defense structures of allied states. At the same time, implementation of this strategy faces both objective and political constraints. In particular, some European governments are concerned that the promotion of asymmetric methods of warfare by the United States could undermine the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force and create institutional risks for domestic political stability. Nevertheless, Washington continues to promote the integration of U.S. SOF into the defense structures of NATO’s eastern flank. According to the author, this enables the United States to pursue two strategic objectives simultaneously: first, the creation of a distributed resistance network capable of sustaining prolonged asymmetric warfare in the event of direct military confrontation; and second, the preservation of substantial influence over European defense policy by limiting the emergence of alternative concepts of collective security.

The formation of the U.S. military budget has traditionally been shaped by both the country’s current and long-term foreign policy priorities. This relationship has become particularly evident in the current period, which is characterized by growing uncertainty regarding the foreign policy approaches of the U.S. leadership amid an increasingly unstable international security environment. The purpose of this article is to examine how the national security priorities of the Trump and Biden administrations have influenced the U.S. military budget and the structure of defense spending. The author conducts a comparative analysis of the doctrinal foundations, strategic priorities, and quantitative benchmarks of budget planning under both administrations. The analysis shows that, during Donald Trump’s first presidential term, military budget allocations were primarily driven by the intensification of great-power competition and the America First doctrine, whereas under the Biden administration the concepts of integrated deterrence and multilateral cooperation came to the forefront. The author also identifies and compares the key trends in the military budget policies of the two administrations, including their dynamics, structural characteristics, and principal funding priorities for strategic initiatives. The findings demonstrate that, despite differences in rhetoric and tactical approaches, both administrations consistently pursued increases in defense spending, reaffirming great-power competition as the central paradigm of U.S. national security strategy. At the same time, the analysis of the logic and dynamics of defense spending illustrates the evolution of U.S. military policy. Whereas the Trump administration prioritized the rapid expansion of combat capabilities through substantial increases in arms procurement and the acceleration of nuclear modernization programs, with a particular focus on countering Russia, the Biden administration emphasized the development of a more technologically advanced, coalition-based deterrence architecture centered primarily on the Indo-Pacific region.