Donald Trump’s Second Presidency: National Interest vs. ‘Rules-Based Order’?

From the outset of his second presidential term, Donald Trump proclaimed a fundamental reassessment of Washington’s foreign policy priorities, explicitlyasserting the primacy of the U.S. national interests over the globalist objectives of maintaining the world order. This discourse has drawn strong criticism from advocates of the so-called liberal international order, traditionally associated with the Democratic Party, who accuse D. Trump of neo-isolationism, of sacrificing principled policy positions for transactionalism, and of undermining the foundations of America’s global leadership. Central to this debate is the concept of the ‘rules-based international order’, championed by liberal internationalists yet explicitly rejected by the Trump’s administration. To better understand the true nature of Washington’s contemporary foreign policy, this article examines the evolution of the ‘rules-based order’ concept, identifies the core elements of the ‘America First’ narrative advocated by the Trump administration, and, on this basis, assesses the arguments of its supporters and opponents. The study reveals that calls for re-evaluating the U.S. role in the international system, including cost-benefit analysis of maintaining the existing order, predate Trump’s presidency. These concerns rather stem from the exhaustion of the unipolar moment and the deepening crisis of liberal global governance models and the Western ideological universalism that effectively underpinned the ‘rules-based order’ concept. In this regard, Trump’s prioritization of national interests over liberal internationalism is quite explicable. However, the unpredictability, penchant for theatricality, and policy inconsistencies that have already marked D. Trump’s tenure generate additional challenges and uncertainties both for Washington’s allies and, especially, for those countries that the U.S. leaders label ‘revisionists’. In this context, the author emphasizes that Trump’s ‘nationalization’ and ‘deglobalization’ of U.S. foreign and economic strategy imply not isolationism or renunciation of global ambitions, but rather a deliberate attempt to replace liberal internationalism with a framework where the United States could operate on a strictly unilateralist basis.

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