Despite the growing academic attention to the problem of interference in internal affairs, rhetorical techniques the state uses to legitimize interventions in the eyes of foreign counterparties, remain somewhat understudied in the Russian IR studies. In this regard, the case of the Monroe Doctrine, a landmark ideological construct in the history of international relations and US foreign policy, provides a unique framework for an in-depth study of the practices of legitimization and stigmatization of interventions. The paper examines the role of the doctrine in denouncing the interference of European powers in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries and justifying US actions in the region. The author outlines a set of issues related to legitimizing, both externally and internally, the actions of the state in the international arena. It is shown that the appeal to national interests suitable for solving the problems of domestic political legitimization, turns out to be ineffective in justifying interventions in the eyes of the international community and therefore gives way to references to established traditions and historical narratives. The paper examines the historical background of the 1823 presidential address and the ways how the US foreign policy establishment appealed to it later on, both to promote the idea of the inadmissibility of European interference in the affairs of the countries of the Western Hemisphere, and, subsequently, to justify American interventionism. Special attention is paid to the so-called Roosevelt Corollary, since it allows one to better understand the specifics of the US leaders’ perception of the Monroe Doctrine and to separate them from the distortions and stereotypes formed during the ensuing public debates and uncritically replicated in many academic studies. The author concludes that, though the Monroe Doctrine is regarded as a cornerstone of US foreign policy, in fact it played a limited role in both diplomatic justification and stigmatization of interventions. In this regard, it is more appropriate to consider it as a rhetorical asset rather than a strict guiding principle. In general, the case of the Monroe Doctrine reveals the situational conditionality of the practices legitimizing interventions, resulting in their limited persuasiveness. The latter seems to be almost inevitable given the constitutive importance of the institution of sovereignty for the maintenance of international society.

The Monroe Doctrine occupies a unique place in the US history. It became one of the key foreign policy documents of its time and provided the basis for a wide variety of interpretations of the United States’ role and goals in the international arena at turning points of world history. One of these moments was the turn of the 1910s−1920s, when a new Versailles-Washington order of international relations was emerging. In the US public discourse, this period was marked by intense debates between supporters of the Democratic President V. Wilson and his isolationist opponents. Both Republicans and Democrats constantly referred to the Monroe Doctrine, on the one hand, to justify their own views on US foreign policy in the new conditions, and, on the other hand, to refute the arguments of their political opponents. The controversy surrounding the Monroe Doctrine has been reflected in publications in periodicals and analytical journals, as well as in cartoons. Studying these materials, it is possible to trace the evolution of the approaches of American politicians, experts, editors, and journalists to the Monroe Doctrine. The arguments of the Republicans against the ‘internationalist’ interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that emerged in the face of the changing global context after the First World War are of particular interest. The study shows that at the initial stage of discussions (1920), the Monroe Doctrine was used by the Republicans primarily to criticize W. Wilson’s concept of international relations in general and his position on the League of Nations in particular. At the next stage (1921−1923), the debate focused around the need to revise the Monroe Doctrine itself, that aroused due to new trends in the development of international relations in the Far East and, in particular, because of the increasing competition between the United States and Japan. The author identifies several main approaches to the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine formulated during the public debate in 1921−1923. It is shown that, despite significant divergences of view, both isolationists and internationalists eventually came to broader interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, recognizing the need to extend its principles to the entire Asia-Pacific region.

The rapid transformation of the current world order excites renewed interest of the expert community in the phenomenon of empire (as a form of the organization of political life). And since the United States plays a central role in this transformation, the history of the Pax Americana, its formation and development, both at the level of the idea and in the field of real politics is of particular relevance. The author argues that clarification of the role and significance of the colonial background in the projection of US military-political power in the late 19th — early 21st centuries allows for better understanding of the theory and practice of international relations both in the era of ‘high imperialism’ and world wars of the 20th century, and in the context of transition from global colonial empires to nuclear superpowers. It may also be instrumental in addressing the deepening contradictions between advocates of a ‘global leadership’ concept and proponents of a multipolar world during the post-Cold War period. In this regard, the paper examines the works of the US military theorists of the late 19th − first half of the 20th centuries that focused on the colonial experience of the leading European powers, as well as the experience gained from interventions involving the US Army and Marine Corps. Special emphasis is given to the concept of ‘small wars’. Building on a wide array of primary sources, presented both by the works of military experts, direct participants in various counterinsurgency operations in the colonies, as well as by the teaching materials and field manuals of the US Marine Corps, the author traces the evolution of this concept which implied establishment of external management and/or control through military and police measures. This allows the author to restore the historical genealogy of current models of internal security promoted in American foreign policy in conditions of proliferating, protracted, and increasingly hybrid civil conflicts. The author concludes that in the interwar period the US law enforcement agencies pragmatically implemented the relevant experience of global empires in Latin American countries within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine, while regarding European powers as political rivals. It is noted that conflicting imperatives of asymmetric and conventional threats to US national security urge researchers and practitioners to revisit after a post-Vietnam period of neglect the approaches of colonial empires to the conduct of small wars and to adapt them to modern conditions. The findings broaden the understanding of the modern leading powers’ approaches to internal security models transfer, as well as of its limits.

The new US foreign policy concept in the Western hemisphere introduced by the American President J. Monroe in December 1823 has become a milestone both in the country’s history and in the theory and practice of international relations in general. For Great Britain, the principles of the Monroe Doctrine acquired new relevance after the end of the First World War. The prospect of unfettered Bolshevik expansion into British colonies and dependent territories in Asia and Africa became a matter of particular concern for the UK ruling circles. It was this threat that forced the military and political elites of Great Britain to turn to the experience of their overseas counterparts and develop a set of measures that can be described as the British edition of the Monroe Doctrine. These measures were directed right against the Bolsheviks’ attempts to revolutionize the national liberation movement and to use it to undermine the ‘colonial rear’ of the imperialist powers. British decision-makers interpreted these attempts as a Bolsheviks’ endeavor to revive the foreign policy practices of the Russian Empire and denoted them as ‘communist militarism’. It is through the lens of the collision of the British edition of the Monroe Doctrine and the concept of ‘communist militarism’ that this study examines the dynamics of the Soviet-British confrontation in Central Asia in the mid-1920s. Special attention is paid to the struggle that took place between the two countries in Iran (Persia), Afghanistan, northwest India, Xinjiang and Tibet. This competition for influence over local rulers took a variety of forms: from information and propaganda campaigns to rivalry in the field of infrastructure and logistics projects. At the same time, it was accompanied by a constant clash of interests of various factions within the USSR and Great Britain, which prevented them from pursuing a coherent policy in the region. Together, these circumstances endowed the Soviet-British rivalry in Central Asia in the 1920s with a number of unique features that does not allow it to be interpreted as just yet another round of the ‘Great Game’.

The UK withdrawal from the European Union forced the country to reevaluate its relations with the outer world. These political and ideological searches culminated in the concept of Global Britain. At the same time, they have drawn attention of the academic community to similar intellectual endeavors at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, when British politicians also faced the need for a qualitative reassessment of the empire’s place in the world. In this context historical references can both help to place the concept of Global Britain within a broader ideological and political framework and shed light on some of its less obvious aspects. And it is particularly interesting to compare it with the concept of Greater Britain, which was extensively discussed during that period. The first section of the paper identifies the origins of the Greater Britain concept, as well as its key provisions. The author notes that the idea of ‘Greater Britain’, aiming to create a sort of federation that would bring together the metropole and the dominions, emerged as a response to growing centrifugal tendencies within the British Empire and intensification of colonial rivalry between the great powers. The second section outlines the conceptual core of the ‘Global Britain’, which involves expanding the scope of the UK foreign policy opportunities after leaving the European Union by establishing a more active interaction with countries and regions that were once part of the empire. The paper emphasizes the migration factor, which served as a fundamental element of the British statehood in various periods of its history and became an integral part of the British political identity. The author argues that there is a certain continuity in the ideological and philosophical content of the two concepts, which were both formulated in similar conditions, both originated from the search for new guidelines for the UK policy in a changing world. However, these concepts shouldn’t be confused. Whereas ‘Greater Britain’ was aimed at consolidating the crumbling empire, ‘Global Britain’ is intended primarily to bridge various divides across the society, which in turn implies re-examination of the UK national identity in general. The author concludes that the concept of Global Britain in its current form cannot address these issues, on the contrary, it rather epitomizes the lack of innovative ideas and solutions among contemporary British elites.

The book under review is a new monograph by A.A. Vershinin and N.N. Naumova ‘From triumph to disaster: Political and military defeat of France in 1940 and its origins’, published in 2022. In order to separate myth from reality and restore, as far as possible, an accurate picture of those tragic events, the authors of the monograph under review turn to a wide array of sources — ranging from memoirs of direct participants to archival documents from various countries. They also thoroughly examined the works of both classic and contemporary researches on the military and political history of France. A.A. Vershinin and N.N. Naumova provide an exceptionally detailed picture of the main political, social, military, cultural and ideological reasons that provoked the defeat of the French army. The authors debunk the popular myth that this defeat allegedly resulted from a shortage of military equipment. They show instead that it was caused by a complex of factors: instability of the Third Republic’s regime, contradictions between political parties, strategic miscalculations of the military and politicians. The authors stress that the defeat of France, which allowed the Third Reich to take a dominant position in Europe, became an important milestone in the history of international relations. According to the reviewer, A.A. Vershinin and N.N. Naumova rightly conclude that the old France, which once determined the fate of the world, perished in May-June 1940 in the battles of the Meuse and Dunkirk.