In the history of rivalry between regional and extra-regional players in South Arabia, the relationship between the United Kingdom and Egypt holds a special place. In the 1960s, the Anglo-Egyptian struggle acquired a qualitatively new dimension against the backdrop of the Yemeni civil war, providing one of the first examples of the socalled proxy wars in the Middle East. The first section of the article considers the origins of the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry in the region and identifies its immediate participants, namely, the Kingdom of Yemen, independent from Great Britain, the British protectorates of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Crown Colony of Aden. The author notes that after G.A. Nasser, a major proponent of the pan-Arabism ideology, came to power in Egypt, it became particularly challenging for Britain to maintain its position in the region. The second section examines the British elites’ conflicting attitudes and approaches to responding to the rise of Arab nationalism in South Arabia after the failure of the Suez operation. On the one hand, the United Kingdom was unprepared to engage in full-scale military operations in the region, which was fraught with the risk of a complete loss of its authority in the Arab world. On the other hand, British politicians were obsessed with suspicions regarding Nasser’s expansionist plans and sought to demonstrate him and the world their readiness to protect their interests. The author shows that between 1956 and 1958 the United Kingdom confined itself to organizing raids by tribes loyal to the British Crown, into the Kingdom of Yemen and delivering surgical strikes in areas controlled by its protectorates. The third section traces the evolution of the British approach to military engagement in South Arabia: from localized ‘retaliatory strikes’ to a sort of hybrid warfare with Egypt in the territory of the Yemeni Republic, proclaimed in 1962. The author notes that Harold Macmillan’s cabinet was pushed toward stronger support for Yemeni royalists not only by rapidly unfolding regional developments and the growing fervor of Arab nationalists but also by mounting criticism of the Conservative Party’s policies from within–namely, the ‘Aden Group’ and the opposition. The article concludes that the shift to proxy warfare tactics was a deliberate step by the British leadership, shaped by both the lessons of the Suez debacle and the inertia of imperial thinking. Although this tactic did not allow the United Kingdom to retain access to Aden or resolve the Yemeni conflict in its favor, the experience of proxy warfare in South Arabia remains relevant even in the 21st century.

Every new U.S. administration adopts and publishes a series of key documents outlining the official stance on the most pressing domestic and foreign policy issues. Among the latter issues of war and peace, the assessment of threats and challenges to international security and the role of military force and nuclear weapons in ensuring it occupy not the last place. At the same time, each succeeding administration inevitably adjusts its predecessors’ views on these matters, especially if they belong to a rival political party. In this context, the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2025 creates a special intrigue. To under- stand both the contours of the updated U.S. strategy in the field of international security and its correlation with the approaches of previous administrations, the authors examine the key American political and military planning documents across the following issue areas: 1) overall assessments of the international situation; 2) perceived major security threats and challenges; 3) likely adversaries of the United States; 4) the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. security policy; 
5) views on strategic stability and strategic deterrence; 6) requirements for the U.S. nuclear forces; 7) priorities within nuclear forces modernization programs; and 8) positions on nuclear arms control. The authors conclude that the new Trump administration will undoubtedly introduce certain modifications to the strategic planning documents adopted under Joe Biden, particularly in terms of strengthening the role of nuclear weapons in security policy and advancing missile defense systems. The strategy’s primary focus will likely shift toward China, while Russia-related issues may be deemed less pressing and more manageable in terms of U.S. interests. Meanwhile, nuclear arms control will recede, although efforts to engage China in these activities may continue. Mapped out modernization programs for U.S. strategic nuclear forces will remain intact but could be supplemented by expanded missile defense initiatives. In general, the U.S. security policy is expected to take a more assertive stance, demanding swift and effective resolution of all existing and potential challenges in this domain. 

The Biden administration’s policy toward Russia have plunged U.S.–Russian relations into a deep crisis. The bilateral negotiation process on military and political issues, including disarmament and regional conflicts, has been frozen. Large-scale U.S. economic sanctions have seriously damaged trade, economic, scientific, and technical ties between the two countries. However, the return of Republican Donald Trump to the presidency opens up a window of opportunity for reviving bilateral dialogue on a wide range of issues. The prospects for this dialogue largely depend on the willingness of U.S. leaders to depart from the near-sighted ideologized approaches of the previous adminis- tration to international relations and the role of the United States in them. In order to assess the likelihood of such a revision of Washington’s foreign policy framework, the author examines the views of U.S. political and academic elites on the prospects for the development of Russian-American relations against the backdrop of the transfer of power from Joe Biden to Donald Trump and through the first months of 2025. In this regard, the article covers a wide range of perspec- tives — from adherents of political realism, who advocate the resumption of the Russian–American talks, to liberal hawks and neoconservatives, who assess this dialogue as a threat to democratic and liberal values. The author notes a trend toward a gradual departure of some U.S. political and academic elites from the triumphalism that has dominated the minds of the American establishment since the collapse of the bipolar system. This trend has been most pronounced in assessments of the prospects for a strategic dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation. In this context, many political and academic experts in the United States warn that Washington may engage in this dialogue from a position of relative weakness. However, the author emphasizes that direct U.S. engagement in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine renders a full-fledged resumption of the Russian–American talks on strategic stability nearly impossible. It is not yet clear what the incumbent administration will do to overcome the impasse in Russian–American relations. Constructive negotiations are only possible if both sides are open to an equal dialogue and recognize each other’s legitimate national interests.

The Arctic, which has long been regarded as a region free from international conflicts and contradictions, is gradually becoming an arena of interstate rivalry. At the same time, even the ‘Ukrainian crisis’ of 2014 and the beginning of the special military operation did not completely cancel the mutually beneficial cooperation present in the region. This article identifies potential areas for con- tinuing and possibly deepening the constructive dialogue in the Arctic. In this regard, this article examines the latest trends in interstate cooperation in such areas as international legal regime, interaction in the fields of energy, transport logistics and scientific research, as well as elaboration of an adequate climate strategy and environmental monitoring in the Arctic. The authors conclude that although the destructive position of the ‘collective West’ toward Russia in the Arctic in recent years has created many problems for the development of fruitful international cooperation in the region and has largely devalued the concept of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, opportunities for restoring constructive dialogue in all the areas considered remain. Science diplomacy could play a special role in this process. At the same time, the authors state that this dialogue will develop under new conditions: two hardly overlapping spheres of international cooperation in the Arctic are emerging. One of them encompasses interactions between the countries of the ‘collective West’, crystallizing around the ‘core’ represented by the United States and NATO, while the second centers around relations between Russia and friendly Asian countries (China, Vietnam, India, UAE), and the number of these countries may increase in the future.

The growing instability and conflict in contemporary world politics result in the further erosion of international regimes, particularly those of nuclear nonproliferation. A vivid illustration of this trend is the deepening crisis over Iran’s nuclear program (INP), which not only undermines international security but also acquires a special regional dimension against the backdrop of the escalating Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This context, as well as the pending deadline for the review of Iran’s nuclear dossier in the UN Security Council, makes the study of the  nature and content of the diplomatic efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement of the situation around the INP particularly relevant. This article identifies the specific features of the INP negotiation process, its core principles, and mechanisms, and examines the problems and prospects of further developments around the INP under the current conditions. Building on the neo-institutional approach to international studies, the author concludes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) should be considered an element of a unique negotiation system that encompasses a range of formal and informal norms and practices and can be generally denoted as ‘JCPOA spirit’. However, this system fell into a crisis shortly after the Iran nuclear deal was approved. This article delves into the problems that have effectively led the INP negotiations to an impasse. The author concludes that the lack of progress in resolving the situation around the INP at the current stage is attributed to a number of factors, including the politicization of the negotiation process, the credibility gap between its parties, the reenactment of sanctions against Iran and the introduction of additional demands by the latter on the U.S. and the E3 countries, as well as the breach of the INP specifications and the ‘Israeli’ factor. In this context, the author outlines three scenarios for the developments around Iran’s nuclear dossier given the prospects of the Iran nuclear deal: restoration of the JCPOA in its original form, its partial revision, or failure to revive the arrangement. The author argues that given the unfavorable international political environment, the situation around the JCPOA will develop under the third scenario in the short run. 

In recent years, many regions of the world have witnessed an increasing political and economic rivalry between Western countries and Russia and China.  Central Asia is no exception, where investment flows and international development assistance (IDA) programs are subject to interstate competition and political instrumentalization. This article examines how key Western donors perceive the nature and scale of political investment risks in the region and what tools they use to mitigate them. The first section of the article shows how the global trend toward strengthening the positions of non-Western countries in the structure of financial flows manifests itself at the regional level. The author concludes that this shift in balance toward non-Western states in Central Asia is quite evident, forcing Western countries to adapt their regional policies to the changing landscape of political risks. The second section examines how the policy documents of the leading Western countries, i.e., the United States, Germany, and Great Britain, address the issue of countering the growing influence of Russia and China in Central Asia. The article shows that they all advance the idea of conditioning the provision of development assistance to the implementation of measures designed to reduce the influence of China and Russia on regional affairs. The third section specifies the practical steps taken by the Western states, including those aimed at mitigating political risks for their national businesses in Central Asia. The author shows that, despite certain differences, the main mitigation burden in all three cases lies on the ‘classical’ IDA instruments. The latter include programs aimed at strengthening legal and institutional systems, combating corruption, improvement of the business climate, and transformation of the regional energy infrastructure in order to close it on the Western countries. According to the author, whereas such IDA policies of the Western donors, aimed at mitigating the perceived risks posed to them by the Russian Federation and China, have mixed results, they significantly imperil the foreign economic activities of Chinese and Russian companies in Central Asia. However, the analysis of such risks requires separate applied research. 

For a long time, scientists have been trying to find the root causes of violence and conflicts in the relations between people and communities. The book under review ‘Why war?’ by the British historian R.J. Overy, published in 2024, also delves into these questions. Building on an interdisciplinary approach, the author examines possible prerequisites for war, ranging from biological factors and psychological aspects of individual and group decision-making to the aspiration for dominance and control over resources. R.J. Overy concludes that none of these factors should be overstated; rather, there is a complex combination of various socio-economic, political, psychological, and other reasons that create incentives for states to wage wars. The reviewer concludes that although the monograph has a number of shortcomings, related in particular to the somewhat superficial manner of the author’s reasoning regarding the problems of natural sciences, it can be recommended to political scientists, historians, and international experts as a starting point for further, more profound study of this, unfortunately, still relevant topic.