The paper aims to clarify the origins of contemporary populism, as well as to outline the prospects for further research on this matter. The author examines this phenomenon within the framework of the dominant mainstream in political science. The latter imply the totality of approaches to conceptualization of the key modern social, economic, political and cultural issues. The author advances a hypothesis that both the extreme diversity of the views regarding the nature of populism and the impossibility to develop an all-encompassing defi nition of this paradoxical phenomenon directly stem from the characteristic features of this dominant discourse. The paper shows that this discourse emerged from the overlapping narratives of transition, modernization, free market, unlimited economic growth and ‘the end of history’ and establishes an hierarchy of global knowledge based on three principles: Western dominance, capitalism and liberalism. The author emphasizes that within this theoretical framework non-Western populism is portrayed as a relatively progressive phenomenon, as a means and an indicator of progress towards capitalism and democracy. In this case populism is interpreted as an element of transition to a ‘proper’ Modernity. However, identical political movements, practices and rhetoric of the Western populists are usually portrayed as a deviation from the norm, from Modernity in general and the ideals of liberal democracy in particular. Meanwhile, the paper argues that as Western liberal democracies transform into ‘conciliatory democracies’ (‘oligarchies’) and increasingly resemble ‘defective democracies’, they themselves start to deviate from the normative ideal, just as any regime they label ‘populist’. Therefore, the existing concepts of populism signify not only a certain deviation from the ideal but also the birth of a new reality which cannot be conceptualized within the framework of the contemporary mainstream political science. The concept of populism appears as an ‘empty signifier’ and as a collective term for all inconvenient and troubling social-political phenomena that mainstream political scientists are unable or unwilling to explain.

The concept of populism has been known since Antiquity. However, in recent decades it gained new prominence amongst politicians and political experts. The present paper attempts to reconstruct the image of populism of the 21st century and to assess the viability of populist parties and movements involved in the context of current social and political processes within Western societies. The first section of the paper examines various definitions of populism elaborated by both Russian and foreign political scholars. On that basis the author attempts to identify the core meaning of this phenomenon, its historic roots and psychological underpinnings, as well as a social-political profile today. The author highlights such constituent elements of the populist discourse that crystallized throughout its development, as direct appeal to the public sentiments, oversimplification of reality and the use of manipulative techniques. The second section of the paper examines the origins and characteristic features of the populist wave that spanned across both developed and developing countries in the early 21st century. For that matter, the effects of globalization are considered particularly problematic, as they have uncertain implications for international relations and exacerbate social and economic tensions even within developed societies creating both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. They also allowed various populist movements to take advantage of the growing social instability in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Additionally, the author links the recent rise in the populist sentiments to the deepening crisis of traditional political party systems, the erosion of principles of parliamentarianism and the development of new information and communication technologies. The author stresses that in these circumstances different charismatic leaders gain new opportunities for mobilizing public support. The research concludes that the prospects for the ongoing populist wave are best described by a formula, proposed by a German political scientist Klaus von Beyme: ‘Populism never lasts very long — but it is somehow always around’.

The paper examines formation, evolution and political perspectives of the Spanish radical left-wing populist party ‘We Can!’ (Podemos) in the face of growing support for populism in the the Southern European countries as well as in the European Union in general. The author identifies the origins and country-specific characteristics of the left-wing populism in Spain and provides the general overview of trends in the country’s party system since the middle of the 2000s, including the growing axiological, generational, political and ideological cleavages in the Spanish divided society. Special attention is paid to the political portrait of the Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias and the prospects for development of political situation in the country after his resignation and subsequent electoral defeat in the Autonomous Community of Madrid in May 2021. As such, this case study can provide some useful insights on the nature of populism in the EU member-states in general. In particular, the paper shows that the fragmentation of traditional political systems and the impacts of the sovereign debt crisis per se do not provide a sufficient explanation for the growing demand for populist rhetoric and charismatic leaders, but rather they have exposed certain structural economic and social imbalances. It is exactly these imbalances which traditional political parties are unable to address that create a breeding ground for various left- and right-wing parties and movements. As a result, the author concludes that populism will remain an essential element of political landscape in Spain despite all scandals that accompany populist politicians as the case of Pablo Iglesias has clearly demonstrated. At the same time the author emphasizes that it is this clear and imminent threat posed by the populist movements that may eventually serve as an impetus for a renewal of traditional parties and of the country’s political system in general.

A relatively broad support enjoyed by the populist and nationalist parties and movements (AfD, National Democratic Party of Germany, PEGIDA), as well as a higher rate of hate crimes in the eastern part of the Federal Republic of Germany raise a question on the nature of nationalism in this region. The present paper examines the causes of widespread xenophobic and nationalist sentiments in the ‘new’ federal states. To this end, the authors address a wide range of social-political and psychological factors, focusing on the historical roots and causes of the recent rise of nationalism in East Germany. Particularly, the authors show that the right-wing parties took advantage of popular frustration caused by the collapse of the East German economy after the country’s reunification and massive unemployment by putting all the blame on migrants. Nevertheless, the causes of growing xenophobia in East Germany were far from being solely economic. For example, the authors underline the role of the politics of memory in the GDR and primarily the approaches of its leaders to the issues of the Nazi past and their attempts to draw on the country’s history to shape a new national identity. However, the failure of the state to provide an unbiased view on the national history, rigid official ideology and its alienation from the popular demands have led to the growing nationalism in the GDR. Besides, a number of other aspects is pointed out which have also fostered xenophobic sentiments in this part of the country. Unlike West Germany which started to accept labour migrants from Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia back in 1950s, the GDR saw few foreigners and contacts between them and local population were limited. As a result, the paper not only helps to create a more detailed image of the East German nationalism but also to identify the underlying causes of the growing popularity of right-wing populist parties and movements in the FRG, most notably, the unfinished process of the country’s reunification and structural imbalances between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ federal states.

The paper analyses the phenomenon of populism and its impact on Turkish foreign policy in three dimensions: institutional, instrumental and ideological. The research scrutinizes a wide selection of party manifestos and public speeches of Turkish politicians with primarily focus on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements during his incumbency as the prime-minister and the president. The embeddedness of populism in political culture of Turkey provided it with ideological flexibility and made populism almost a universal instrument for engaging with electorate. Starting from Turkey’s transition to multiparty system the majority of political actors have resorted to populism in one or another way. Erdoğan has not only continued this tendency but mastered the populist rhetoric. The character and content of Erdoğan’s populism fluctuated following the changing domestic and international environment. In the 2000s it was hinged on the loose concept of conservative democracy. At the turn of the 2000s and 2010s the dreams for the EU membership gave way to ideas of ‘civilizational expansionism’ which had the concept of Islamic/Ottoman civilization as its core. From the mid-2010s ultra nationalism has come to the forefront of the populist rhetoric. Eventually, the populist binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘they’ took a definite shape of global confrontation between Turkey as a defender of Islam and the ‘adverse’ West. Populist rhetoric helped Erdoğan to justify his almost two-decades-long incumbency and evade direct responsibility for economic hardships of the 2010s. Populism has become an effective instrument to monopolize the foreign policy in the hands of Erdoğan. Utilizing negative rhetoric against Turkish professional diplomats within the last decade Erdoğan has managed to cement his clout over the foreign-policy making. Institutionally the expansion of populism in the sphere of foreign policy led to its ‘domestication’ and ‘nationalization’ while its impact on the foreign policy discourse manifested itself in the spread of civilizationism. Making both domestic and foreign policy process more personalized Erdoğan has reinforced ‘personal authoritarianism’ at the expense of the state institutions. Thus their decline led to the ‘Erdoğanization of the Turkish politics’. The declarative pursuit of Turkey to get more independent and autonomous position in the international system resulted in the strategy of development with primarily focus on the bilateral relations with different states. Consequently Turkey, previously known as a consistent advocate of regional cooperation and integration, in many respects has become a regionally isolated state.

The paper examines the foreign policy of Mexico during the first years of President A. M. López Obrador (AMLO) administration (2018‒2020). The research aims to both identify the key priorities of the country’s foreign policy (i.e., relations with the United States and Latin American countries, particularly in the context of the Venezuelan and Bolivian crises, as well as the Central American migration crisis) and to weigh it up against traditional patterns of Mexico’s foreign policy behavior, as well as to assess its overall feasibility. The latter issue is all the more relevant since the center-left administration of AMLO is constantly criticized for its ‘populism’. The paper shows that Mexico continues to prioritize relations with the United States not only in terms of economic cooperation (within the USMCA framework) and in addressing the migration crisis but also in terms of the overall foreign policy agenda setting as well. However, the author emphasizes that although the pressure from the United States is significant and can take various forms, Mexico manages to pursue an independent and multifaceted policy, as the Venezuelan and Bolivian crises have shown. Such a policy is based on the traditional principles that have crystallized during the years of maneuvering between the interests of the great powers and which, according to AMLO and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should not be subject to any revision. These principles include non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for their sovereignty, as well as respect for the right to political asylum. It is these principles that may contribute to reinforcing the international role of Mexico both regionally and globally despite a rather limited involvement of the current administration in foreign policy matters and its focus on domestic issues. Thus, the author concludes that beneath the populist rhetoric of A. M. López Obrador lies a fairly traditional foreign policy, warranted by the domestic situation and international environment.

The review examines a new collective monograph edited by L.S. Okuneva and A.I. Tevdoi-Burmuli: ‘Right-wing populism: Global trend and regional features’, published in 2020. The reviewer notes that a growing interest in both Russian and foreign academic community towards the phenomenon of populism has been witnessed in recent years. However, scholars still haven’t reached a consensus on the nature and content of this phenomenon, its role in the political systems of individual countries and regions, as well as on prospects for its further development. In this regard the book under review which provides a broad geographical and thematic perspective coverage is of particular relevance. At the same time, the reviewer notes that this very breadth provokes critical comments. For instance, the reviewer points to certain imbalances in the structure of the book, as well as some inconsistencies in the authors’ narratives. The latter may be related to the fact that the authors have widely differing approaches to the nature of populism. As a result, the book under review should be considered as a collection of essays united by a common theme rather than a collective monograph based on a common theoretical and methodological framework. However, this in no way downplays academic contribution of each individual author and the relevance of the book as a whole. The reviewer examines each chapter, briefly presenting the author’s position and the key findings, and concludes that the book in general contributes significantly to the academic study of the right-wing populism and raises new research questions. With regard to the latter, the book highlights both the ambiguity of populism, its immanent connection with modern trends in the development of political systems, and the social and psychological factors that contribute to the growing popularity of populist ideas.