The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.

Since the early 1990s, Russia and China have come a long way in developing military cooperation. It began with an exchange of delegations, the reduction of troops along the border, the adoption of confidence-building measures, and, by now, has transformed into a strong partnership. Two countries annually conduct several joint military exercises and develop military training cooperation. In this regard, the Chinese assessments of the Russian military policy after the collapse of the USSR are of particular interest. The survey of specialized publications shows that Chinese scholars commenced studies on the Russian military reforms in the mid-1990s. The author notes that there was a spike of research activity on that matter in 2009 soon after the start of radical reforms of the Russian Armed Forces. Chinese scholars usually identify four waves in the Russian military reforms, each determined by a combination of domestic and external political and economic factors. Chinese military and academic experts assessed these reforms both in terms of their impact on the global balance of power in the military-political sphere and their potential relevance to similar reforms in China. The first two phases of the Russian military reforms (from 1992 to 1997 and from 1997 to 1999) are usually assessed negatively. The general failure of military reforms is attributed to the economic challenges, the lack of political will, and the absence of an adequate theoretical and methodological basis for such transformations. Subsequent reforms (from 2001 to 2004, and, particularly, after 2008) are generally assessed positively. In that regard, Chinese experts emphasize the importance of the processes of political power consolidation and economic recovery that took place in Russia in that period, as well as the role of lessons learned by the Russian military from local wars and armed conflicts. Nevertheless, according to Chinese assessments these reforms still have certain drawbacks, particularly, associated with hasty and misguided attempts to copy the Western military models at the turn of the 2000s — 2010s. In general, Chinese civilian and military experts conclude that throughout a long and difficult process of military reforms Russia has made a significant progress in rearmament and increasing the combat potential of its armed forces. Moreover, such reforms could serve as a valuable source of experience and an example for further development and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China-Russia relations have demonstrated a significant and consistent progress on a number of issues advancing to the strategic alliance. However, the existing explanations of such progress have rarely gone beyond simple recognition of the continuous deterioration of relations between these countries and the West, particularly the United States. However, such explanations seem insufficient since they do not reveal the key determinants of the Russian-Chinese alignment and cannot help assess the sustainability of this trend. In order to provide a comprehensive and methodologically consistent assessment of the main drivers of the China-Russia relations within the framework of the post-Cold War international system evolution, this paper draws on the latest findings in the theory of international alliances. To this end, the author harnesses the epistemological potential of the three main approaches to the root causes of interstate strategic alliances, namely the ‘balance of power’, the ‘balance of threat’ and the ‘balance of interests’. The paper examines the Russian-Chinese cooperation both within the framework of each of these three balances separately and in their interrelatedness and interdependence. The author shows that trend towards a closer strategic cooperation between China and Russia in the post-Cold War period stemmed from the inner dynamics of all of these balances. This strategic alignment is based on a complex of shared views on the United States as the main source of threats for national security and the commitment of both states to the idea of a multipolar world. The author concludes that not only will the trend towards strengthening Russian-Chinese cooperation continue, at least in the medium term, but it can receive a new impetus to evolve into a full-fledged alliance.

Due to a rapid economic growth over the past several decades China has significantly strengthened its international positions. This growth in its own turn was to a large extent due to a pragmatic and sound foreign strategy that the country has been pursuing since mid-1970s. However, in recent years both within and outside China there has been an on-going debate on the alleged radical transformation of the PRC’s perceptions of its national interests, its place in world politics, and its foreign policy. The variety of opinions becomes increasingly complicated as the number of discussants grows and new arguments are adduced in support of different positions. Whereas outside China this debate structures around the narrative of the Chinese assertiveness, within the country the main dispute is between the advocates of a traditional policy of ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguang yanghui) and proponents of a new ‘striving for achievements’ (fenfa youwei) strategy. The present paper aims to provide a framework for a systematization of debates on the contemporary foreign policy of China in the English language academic literature based on two criteria: whether a researcher admits that the Chinese foreign policy is changing and how he assesses implications of these changes. Such an approach undoubtedly entails certain schematization of the presented views and arguments. However, it differs favorably from traditional, more narrative approaches to conceptualization of the debate since it establishes a clear, transparent theoretical framework aimed to identify the substantive core of the presented views. This, in turn, can bring about a better understanding of the current state and possible evolution of Chinese foreign policy in general. The author concludes that although these debates are far from being over, most researchers admit the PRC’s foreign policy strategy is undergoing a radical transformation. Since the latter half of 2000s there has been a steady trend in the foreign policy of China towards greater assertiveness. At the same time this transformation ensures continuity of the basic principles of Chinese diplomacy. All this means that further debates on the Chinese foreign policy should focus primarily on potential implications of this transformation for the PRC, the regional dynamics and international relations system as a whole.

The process of globalization has turned international economy into an arena of direct and indirect conflict of interests of various actors. It has also provided states with a new tool for their foreign policy activity — economic diplomacy. The paper focuses on the economic diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China, which not only has become the second important center of the world economy, but is starting to realize its increased capabilities, demonstrating ambitions of a new leader in international relations. The first section outlines the main features of the PRC’s economic diplomacy. The second section focuses on the key areas and specific mechanisms of the so-called incentive economic diplomacy. In this regard, the author emphasizes two trends: on the one hand, China aims at effectively integrating into existing international formats and institutions of global economic governance, but, on the other hand, it shows willingness to take the lead and initiate its own ambitious projects. The Silk Road Fund and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as well as the mega-project ‘The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road’ are the most striking examples of the latter trend. Incentive economic diplomacy also serves as an important tool for strengthening the soft-power potential of the PRC in the international arena, especially in developing countries. At the same time, the author stresses that in recent years the PRC resorts more actively to the use of offensive forms of economic diplomacy, such as sanctions. This trend is examined in the third section of the paper. The international crisis provoked by SARS-CoV-2 pandemic became a moment of truth and a stress test for the new foreign policy system of the PRC. The fourth section analyses new challenges faced by China’s economic diplomacy in the context of the pandemic. These challenges have both an objective (the need for quick national economic recovery) and subjective dimensions. The latter implies the wholescale information war as the PRC and the countries of the collective West led by the United States started playing blame game. The author notes that, under these circumstances the PRC’s ‘COVID-19 diplomacy’ becomes more aggressive, which negatively affects the already tarnished national image. However, the author concludes, that although the current Chinese economic diplomacy generates rather negative sentiments in both developed and developing countries, it is exactly economic diplomacy that could, if properly used, help the PRC to establish itself as a leading actor in the new bipolar world order.

The paper examines the role of investment cooperation and national foreign investment regime as a means to promote China’s economic and political interests and to respond to new global challenges that the country faces nowadays. To this end, the author examines the main stages of China’s liberalization of the legal regime for foreign investment from the end of the 1970s with a special focus on a new foreign investment law. In doing so the author attempts to link the evolution of investment regulation in the PRC with the dynamics of international relations development and the changing role of China as a regional and global actor. The author emphasizes that a trend towards the emergence of a polycentric world order not only provokes the rise of international tensions but also provides new incentives to promote dialogue and enhance cooperation between states and non-governmental actors, particularly by encouraging foreign investments. At the same time, there is a growing need to improve regulatory mechanisms for direct foreign investments. All these contradictory trends have directly affected China’s foreign investment regime reform. In this context the investment cooperation between the PRC and the European Union is of particular importance. The EU possesses a set of innovative technological solutions and competencies that are of particular interest to the Chinese leaders in the context of their efforts to modernize the country’s economy. The paper examines the volume, dynamics and key directions of investment flows between China and the EU member-states. The fact that after seven years of difficult negotiations, the EU and China managed to develop a special bilateral regulatory mechanism — EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment — underscores again the importance of this cooperation for both parties. Even though the EU has suspended the ratification of this deal on the pretext of human right violations in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the author concludes, that in the future this agreement will come into force, since the very logic of the emerging polycentric world order urges for deeper cooperation between the EU and China. In this context, the investment regulation appears not only as a means to protect the Chinese economic interests, but also as an instrument to strengthen China’s international positions in the changing global context.