The paper examines the formation of the Soviet state and its place within the European international relations system in the first half of the 1920s both in the context of new principles of interstate interaction, the character of economic relations between countries, and geopolitical transformations triggered by the First World War. The first section covers the political and ideological aspects of relations between Soviet Russia/the USSR and Western countries. The author shows that, despite the prominence of ideological conflict in the development of the IR system that emerged after the First World War, continuous tensions both between the defeated and the victors and among the latter urged the political and military elites of Western states to consider the Soviet Russia as a situational partner even under the Bolsheviks rule. The difference in the assessments of the ideological conflict with Soviet Russia, and then with the USSR by Western statesmen stemmed from the difference in their assessments of the prospects for the evolution of the Soviet regime, as well as of the commitment of the Soviet leaders to the idea of the world revolution. The second section of the paper focuses on the role that was assigned to the Soviet state in various plans for the European economy reconstruction after the First World War. While the largest European states, Great Britain and Germany in particular, were interested in involving the Soviet state in the system of trade and economic relations (to get access to its resources in order to restore their own economies, and to open up the prospect of transforming the Soviet system towards capitalism), the Soviet leaders considered access to the European market as a necessary condition for the industrialization which was seen as the key to survival of the first socialist state in a hostile capitalist environment. In this regard the author notes that although Soviet Russia advocated for the revolutionary transformation of the entire IR system, she was unable to enforce it and eventually turned into a status quo power. However, the awareness of hostility by the Western world and the desire to preserve its unique socio-economic order, kept Moscow from attempts to integrate deeply into the Versailles system. In turn, the Western leaders, for all the differences in their approaches towards the Eastern European region and despite de facto recognition of the USSR demonstrated the growing alienation towards the Soviet regime as they became disillusioned with the prospects for its possible transition. This inability to predict the future development of the USSR, as well as to control the situation in Eastern Europe in general were among the factors that instigated the leading European power — Great Britain — to devise a scheme of the European security system without the USSR, which was embodied in the Locarno agreements of 1925.

The signing of the Declaration on the formation of the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922 marked a new stage in the history of international relations, and, at the same time, took stock of intense domestic and international political struggle unfolding in the previous years. The developments within the Communist International were of particular importance for both the outcomes of this struggle and the future of international labor movement. The author stresses that for the Comintern the year of 1922 was dominated by a struggle between the two opposing ideological and political trends: the inertia of the ‘storm and onslaught’ enthusiasm of the first post-revolutionary years and the rise of the ideas of peaceful coexistence. In this context, the paper assesses the role that the Bolshevik leaders envisaged for the Comintern during the preparation and conduct of the Genoa Conference and, particularly, for the policy of the united workers front. The author shows that the very idea of cooperation with socialists and social democrats received an extremely ambiguous reaction from representatives of Western communist parties. In this regard, the position of the German Communist Party (KPD) was of particular importance to the Bolshevik leaders. Indeed, the case of KPD was emblematic of those tendencies and contradictions that marked the development of the international communist movement in the period under review. The KPD leaders welcomed the Comintern’s turn towards a united workers front. However, the author notes that this support was based on a highly unstable compromise between multiple contradicting domestic and foreign policy imperatives, including opposition from the left-wing radicals within the party and continuous conflict with the government of the Weimar Republic, exacerbated by ideological and financial dependence on Moscow. As a result, the KPD’s actions were very often ad hoc and inconsistent, reflecting general issues typical to the international labor movement of that period. That became clear during the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, which took place at the end of 1922. It failed to outline a clear strategy for interaction between the Russian Bolsheviks and foreign communists. At the same time, the outcomes of the Fourth Congress were crucial for further evolution of the ideology and practical activities of the Comintern. The policy of the united workers front got a broader definition as the Communist International started to recognize the threat posed by fascism.

The paper examines the formation of the Soviet state and its place within the European international relations system in the first half of the 1920s both in the context of new principles of interstate and economic interactions and geopolitical transformations triggered by the First World War. In the case of Soviet Russia, the latter implied the need to break international isolation and economic blockade which pushed Soviet leaders to intensify efforts to restore economic and political ties with the Western states after the Civil War and intervention. The paper focuses on the peripeteias of interaction between the Soviet and British diplomacy at the key international summits of 1922 — the Genoa, the Hague, and the Lausanne conferences. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources from the Russian and British archives, as well as the memoirs of the participants, their official and personal correspondence, the author examines the achievements and miscalculations of Moscow and London in attempts to stabilize the Versailles-Washington world order on the eve and during these conferences. The author emphasizes that the Kremlin managed to pave the way for the diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik regime by the leading powers and to take part in the discussion on Black Sea straits regime, while Whitehall managed to strengthen imperial positions both in Europe and in the Middle East, although the prospects of rapprochement between Moscow and Berlin and Ankara remained a major concern for the Foreign Office. However, these conferences failed to address the issue of Russian debts and it continued to be an obstacle to the normalization of bilateral relations. The author highlights a number of other significant factors that affected the outcomes of the conferences: the lack of a coordinated foreign policy approaches both among the Bolsheviks and within the British government, the persistence of stereotypes about the Bolsheviks, as well as an emerging trend towards rapprochement between the vanquished and the revisionist states which was particularly dangerous for the Versailles-Washington order. As for the outcomes of the diplomatic rivalry between Moscow and London, the author concludes that these conferences provided the parties with an invaluable opportunity to discuss the key issues of bilateral relations and European big politics and can rightfully be considered an important step in the development of the post-war international relations from confrontation to constructive interaction.

The consolidation of the Soviet state in 1922 and the activities of Soviet diplomacy in the key international forums had a direct impact on the strategic situation in Europe. The eventual strengthening of Soviet Russia/the USSR was both a threat and an opportunity for France as one of the leading European powers of that period, which had obligations and interests in Central and Eastern Europe. The author aims to identify the main approaches of French diplomats and the military to a set of issues related to the possible development of Soviet Russia in 1922 and its place in the European balance of power. The study is based on a wide range of primary sources from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, the National Archives of France, the Historical Service of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Fifth Republic, as well as on recently published French diplomatic and military documents. The author concludes that the French elites had a rather ambiguous attitude towards the process and the first results of political consolidation and socio-economic development of the Soviet state. On the one hand, the formation of the USSR was an obvious manifestation of the growing Soviet power that somewhat diminished the hopes of French officials for the imminent fall of the Bolsheviks. At the same time, diplomats and the military both in Paris and on-site were often skeptical about the prospects for the development of the Soviet economy, noting the catastrophic consequences of hunger, economic and financial ruin. Moderate optimism about the opportunity to intensify trade and economic contacts with Soviet Russia as its economy recovers coexisted with pronounced pessimism. The French assessments of the military potential of the Soviet state were marked by the same ambivalence. The acknowledgement of the current limited capabilities of the Red Army and the Red Fleet was accompanied by the growing recognition that the basis of the military power of the Soviet state had not been undermined. All this could help Moscow improve its international stance in the future, which would inevitably affect the balance of power in Europe. Under these circumstances, the French elites debated the prospects for the ‘normalization’ of the Bolshevik regime and its incorporation into the Versailles order. The author argues that all these contradictory attitudes, views and assessments that surfaced in 1922 to a large extent predetermined the overall direction and specific content of the French policy towards the USSR in the following years.

The paper examines the evolution of approaches and assessments of the US political and academic establishment regarding the national-territorial transformation of Russia at the final stage of the First World War, during the Revolution and the Civil War. During that period the US diplomacy was focused on developing and implementing its own ambitious program for the liberal-democratic reorganization of the post-war world with particular focus on issues of national self-determination. As a result, Wilson’s administration could not remain indifferent to the dramatic changes on the territory of the former Russian Empire. However, as the author notes, for European politicians its responses appeared rather unusual and often puzzling. The latter was due to a very specific interpretation of the principle of national self-determination adopted by W. Wilson and his associates as the right of the civil society to self-government rather than the right to ethnic separation. At the same time, the right to independently determine their own destiny was reserved, in a spirit of social-Darwinism, only for peoples who had reached a certain maturity. And moreover, each particular case was additionally assessed in terms of both political rationality and developments of political situation in Russia in general. For instance, the US liberal political and academic establishment consistently supported the independence of Poland and Finland while most other national minorities (the peoples of the Baltic region, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, the peoples of Central Asia, etc.) were usually encouraged to defend their autonomy within a united and democratic Russia. The author notes, that the US policy towards Russia became particularly controversial after the Bolsheviks came to power: the consistent rejection of the Bolshevik reforms was accompanied by the reluctance to incite separatism on the national outskirts out of fear of Russia’s uncontrolled disintegration and its subsequent transformation into a site of endless ethnic conflicts. As a result, the United States did not recognize most of the national entities that declared their independence in 1917–1922. At the same time, the author concludes that the growing ideological and political confrontation with Soviet Russia in the following years did not allow the US leaders to adequately assess the national-territorial transformations that were brought about by the creation of the USSR.

As we approach the 100th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, political, military, social, ethnic and other determinants of consolidation of the peoples and territories of the former Russian Empire within the Bolshevik state attract an increasing interest of academic community. In particular, special attention is drawn to the complex and controversial process of integration of the South Caucasus with Soviet Russia. Soviet historiography advanced an official view on the role of the Transcaucasian republics in the formation of the USSR, which came down to a number of ideological clichés that provided an impoverished and partly distorted image of this complex phenomenon. On the basis of a wide range of Soviet, Russian, and foreign researches, as well as recently published primary sources, the author examines the landmark events in the history of the states of the South Caucasus in the period preceding the formation of the USSR. The author highlights both similarities and differences in the views of Soviet and modern historians on the related issues, including the realization of the right to self-determination of the peoples of the South Caucasus in the first years after the October Revolution and the complex impact of international political situation on the regional developments. The author notes that the struggle for spheres of influence between world powers also affected all the Transcaucasian republics, although with different results. The author pays special attention to the process of Sovietization: in the Soviet historiography it was portrayed as a triumphal march of Soviet rule, but, as recent researches has shown, the Bolsheviks actually did not have a clear and consistent plan for the Sovietization of the Transcaucasian republics and the process was accompanied by dramatic events and conflicts. The assessments of the subsequent formation of the Transcaucasian Federation also differ significantly. The Soviet interpretation of this project emphasized its importance for eliminating the consequences of the Civil War and resolving inter-ethnic conflicts. Contemporary historians point to the fact that the unification process was imposed artificially, and even forcefully, according to some assessments, by Moscow, and its unifying effect was rather mixed. In this context, the author emphasizes the need for an impartial and balanced research approach towards the processes that took place in the Transcaucasian republics in the first post-revolutionary years in order to gain a better understanding of their role in the creation of the USSR.

The conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Latvia and the RSFSR on August 11, 1920 marked an important stage both in the process of international recognition of Latvia and in the normalization of international relations in the region in general, and charted a new course of the foreign policy of the Soviet state. On the basis of a wide range of archival sources (transcripts of the plenary meetings of the RSFSR and Latvia delegations, the meetings minutes of the Soviet-Latvian boundary commission, etc.), as well as recent Russian and foreign historical researches, the paper examines a set of issues related to the conclusion of the Treaty. The key issues that predetermined the agenda of the Soviet-Latvian peace negotiations included border demarcation, the exchange of war prisoners, the return of property evacuated to Russia, the return of refugees and the establishment of procedures for citizenship option. The author notes that the issue of border delimitation and demarcation was one of the most controversial and painful during the negotiations. The ethnographic principle for future borders was inextricably linked with economic and military-strategic considerations. The author examines territorial concessions made by the RSFSR to Latvia and concludes that they served as a demonstration of the Soviet Russia readiness to take into account the territorial claims of the Baltic republics, which allowed it to achieve peace in the region and fix new borders, as well as to establish trade relations indispensable for the survival of a young Soviet state during the Civil War. At the same time, the Soviet representatives took a hard line on compensations for the damage caused during hostilities and the return of property evacuated from Latvia. The author concludes that the Soviet-Latvian treaty and similar treaties with other Baltic states not only enabled the establishment of a new balance of power in the East Baltic region for the interwar period and laid the foundation for the Soviet foreign policy towards the Baltic republics, but also served as a vivid example of realization of ‘the right of self-determination of peoples up to secession’. Finally, these treaties became one of the means to break the diplomatic isolation of Soviet Russia.