The nuclear policy of the three successive U.S. administrations over the last twenty years has revealed both continuity and change. However, a growing uncertainty over the future of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) after February of 2021 necessitates a broader chronological perspective on the evolution of the U.S. nuclear policy in order to separate short-term considerations from long-term trends. In turn, this may provide the framework for forecasting trends in the U.S. nuclear policy development regardless of the outcome of the 2020 elections. This paper examines nuclear policies of the George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump administrations as set out in the Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) of 2002, 2010, and 2018 respectively and related strategic planning documents, as well as its manifestations in both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons development plans. The authors track the origins of the Donald Trump’s nuclear policy and demonstrate its continuity with the previous administrations’ strategies. The paper examines plans of large-scale modernization of all components of the U.S. nuclear triad outlined in the 2018 NPR. The authors assess the potential consequences of both the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the non-renewal of the New START. The conclusion is drawn that with regard to Iran and North Korea the Trump administration’s policy will be largely similar to the policy of the G.W. Bush government but more assertive since the former considers nuclear weapons not only as a means of deterrence but as an efficient tool of military and political coercion. In its dealings with Russia and China the current administration might apply the so-called ‘Schlesinger Doctrine’, which might entail a return to the Cold War-era principles and strategies, though in a much more complex strategic environment. The authors warn of the risk of causing a recurrence of dramatic events similar to the 1962 and 1983 crises and express the hope that lessons drawn from the Cold War will pave the way for a new compromise.

The European Union — the world’s largest collective donor — directs much of its assistance to the Middle East and North Africa countries. The Kingdom of Morocco is, however, a special case among the EU partners in the MENA. It was the first Southern Mediterranean country to receive a status of a ‘privileged partner’ back in the 2000s, and has been the largest beneficiary of aid from Brussels ever since. The paper identifies strategic directions, priority areas, and main outcomes of the EU assistance programs in Morocco in 1999–2011, from the King Mohammed VI’s ascension to throne to the Arab Awakening. Special attention is paid to the evolution of motives behind the EU assistance and changes in the nature of aid programs implemented in Morocco in interrelation with the political processes within the country. The author examines aid delivery mechanisms, distribution of aid through the Government and to civil society institutions in Morocco, as well as terms of such assistance. The paper also considers balance between the so called policy assistance aimed at strengthening the justice sector, promotion of good governance and so on, on the one hand, promotion of economic and social development and security sector reforms — on the other. The conclusion is drawn that in their efforts to ensure further liberalization of Morocco the EU leaders tend to rely on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the privileged partnership, social, economic and institutional support rather than on programs directly aimed at democracy promotion. This approach stems largely from the intent to promote political stability in the Kingdom of Morocco — the EU key partner in countering such transnational threats as illegal migration and terrorism. This approach (typical of the EU cooperation with other autocratic regimes in the MENA, both monarchiсal and republican) explains a relatively low-key reaction of the EU bureaucrats to the slowdown — of the liberalization processes in the 2000s, which occurred in the face of unfolding war on terror and resulted in Morocco being affected by the Arab Awakening.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been playing an important role in the Middle Eastern subsystem being heavily affected by the events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict zone, as well as wars in Iraq or Syria. External factors compound the Jordanian authorities’ efforts to overcome the numerous internal economic, social and political challenges causing regular protests, sometimes of a quite considerable scale. At the same time Jordan is extremely dependent on external support. It has been receiving the bulk of aid from the United States that regards stability of Jordan as one of key interests in the region and often acted as a mediator between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom. This paper provides a detailed examination of the rationale behind the US aid to Jordan and the fluctuations in its volume and structure at different phases of the US-Jordanian relations with a focus on the period between two waves of protests — of 1989 and 2011. Special attention is paid to the ‘Israeli factor’ which would play a crucial role in the US-Jordanian relations. The paper’s first section contains a brief overview of the history of the relations between the United States and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during the Cold War. The second section focuses on the last decade of King Hussein’s rule (1989–1999). The final section examines the policies of his son, Abdullah II — from his ascension to throne until the ‘Jordanian Spring’ of 2011. The conclusion is drawn that the United States was always aware of fragility of Jordanian statehood built around the king. However, the importance of Jordan for addressing pivotal regional сhallenges (such as countering the spread of Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union’s influence in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict and — later — the Israel-Palestinian peace process or the War on Terror), forced the consecutive US administrations, regardless of their party affiliation, to turn a blind eye to the lack of real progress in the implementation of liberal reforms in the Hashemite Kingdom. Moreover, it was the steady flow of foreign assistance that allowed the Jordanian monarchy to halt promised reforms. Thus, it seems quite natural that the Arab Awakening of 2011 did affect Jordan creating the most serious political challenge to the royal family’s rule since the late 1980s.

Information and communication technologies play an increasingly important role in international development theory and practice. However, the international donors’ activities in this field (known as ICT for Development or ICT4D) have yielded mixed results. On the one hand, over a short period of time mobile technologies have ceased to be a privilege of the Global North and have become widespread in developing countries. On the other hand, the development of the ICT sector has had certain negative implications for the Global South. Exponential growth of technological knowledge has widened the gap between the developed and the developing world. Furthermore, new technologies have been introduced and distributed in developing countries very unevenly. Although researchers have various explanations for failures of many ICT4D programs and projects, their poor performance is largely attributable to the intrinsic weaknesses of their conceptualisation which influenced the formulation of goals, expected outcomes and risks assessment. This paper examines the international experience in ICT4D and tracks the evolution of the donors’ stated objectives. The first section outlines conceptual foundations of the ‘ICT for Development’ agenda. The second section examines the evolution of the key donors’ approaches to the ICT sector development in the 1970s and 1980s, which was primarily aimed at promoting economic growth in the Global South. The third section highlights donors’ new policies and priorities outlined in the mid-1990s and focusing predominantly on social factors of development. The final section summarizes the key provisions of critical approaches to ICT4D, which have gained prominence over the last decade. In each section the author examines both conceptual frameworks of the key donors’ policies, and concrete initiatives of international organizations, as well as their financing parameters and modalities. The conclusion is drawn that international actors’ ICT4D efforts resemble a patchwork of isolated programs and initiatives rather than a harmonious structure. Meanwhile, a half-of a century-long history of experimentation with the ICT4D programs shows quite convincingly that the ICT should be regarded only as a means to achieve development goals, and not as an end in itself.

ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) is the ASEAN’s newest and ambitious initiative aimed at maintaining peace in the region by establishing common norms and standards of good conduct. The launch of the APSC has provoked an intense debate among experts on ASEAN on whether the Association could be regarded as a security community in the classic theoretical sense. The author examines arguments in the key participants of this debate and presents its own point of view. The paper shows that constructivist scholars led by A. Acharya argue that their interpretation of the classic security community concept is relevant to the situation in the Southeast Asia, which is characterized by a strong sense of regional identity and a constitutive political role of norms. Their opponents represented by realist scholars, such as N. Khoo and M. Leifer, demonstrate the irrelevance of constructivist ideas to the ASEAN realities and emphasize the inability of Southeast Asian states to build a functioning security community. The conclusion is drawn that while both approaches have their own drawbacks, it would be premature to choose one or the other because the establishment of the security community in the ASEAN is an ongoing process, which is still far from complete. Therefore, the most promising and relevant for current political situation in the region is a moderately critical approach that treats ASEAN as a security regime rather than a security community.

The book under review is a new monograph ‘The Soft Power of the United Kingdom’ by Elena M. Kharitonova, published by the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The reviewer emphasizes that a distinguishing advantage of this book over many contemporary Russian and foreign scholarly works on soft power is its special focus on both theoretical aspects of soft power policies and the bibliography of this phenomenon. The reviewer considers this approach especially relevant given the fact that it is impossible to fully comprehend the essence of Joseph Nye’s ideas without a clear understanding of the role of soft power concept in the studies of power in international relations. The review examines each of three chapters of the book, outlines strengths and weaknesses of the author’s position. For instance, the reviewer points to a somewhat descriptive (rather than analytical) character of certain book sections and at times excessively uncritical treatment of public statements. However, the reviewer stresses that these shortcomings do not in any way downplay the merits of the book, which stands out as a novel, comprehensive, and highly relevant piece of research carried out with great professionalism. The book examines, summarizes and structures a significant amount of data from various sources (the Parliament documentation, the UK political parties’ manifestos, media reports, surveys of public opinion and soft power indexes). In that regard the book under review not only yields a significant contribution to studies on the role of soft power in the foreign policy of the United Kingdom but may also serve aa a good basis for the formulation of practical recommendations for both improving RussianBritish contacts (for example in science diplomacy) and developing the Russian approaches to ‘soft power’.