In 2021 the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus celebrate the 30th anniversary of independence. According to the paradigm of transitology, the political development of a state since the departure from the authoritarian regime entails progressive liberalization and democratization of political processes. And, in accordance with the predominant theoretical approaches, the post-Soviet states were expected to follow this path. However, a closer look at the specifi c scenarios of power alternation in the Central Asia and the South Caucasus provides a much more mixed picture: here the change of ruling elites took very diff erent forms and shapes. The choice of scenario for the transfer of power was always determined by a complex combination of internal and external factors, including the nature and characteristics of the political system of a particular state, its ethnic com-position, the socio-economic situation and external environment. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern several key scenarios: a ‘revolutionary’ scenario, which implies a violent change of power; an intra-elite consensus; transition of power to a successor; a hereditary transmission of power; democratic elections; a resigna-tion of a president. A comparative analysis of the political processes unfolding in the region over the past 30 years shows that even institutionally the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are not ready yet for a competition policy. 
Moreover, the latter is generally viewed by their leaders as a threat to both the stability of the state and to the interests of the ruling elites. To this may be added the expansion of diff erent informal, archaic political practices across the post-Soviet space. The latter include the sacralization of power, when national interests are equated with the interests of the ruling clan and the whole national identity is built up around this nexus. All this shows the limits of classical transitology theory when it comes to political transformations in the post-Soviet space, which it is unable to explain, yet alone to predict their possible future development. Thus, there is a strong need to develop new theoretical frameworks that would better accommodate particularities of the regional political systems.

The Central Asian region due to its economic potential and strategic signifi -cance has traditionally been of particular importance for Russia’s foreign policy. 
It was therefore not surprising that a serious deterioration of the political situation in Afghanistan in summer-autumn 2021 caused by the military defeat and the subsequent collapse of the pro-Western regime followed by the seizure of power by the Taliban raised serious concern of the Russian leadership. The developments in Afghanistan have attracted an increasing attention of the expert community, prompting a fl urry of comments and forecasts. Although many of these papers were published hastily, their assessments and conclusion were usually based on the long-term observations. This paper attempts to provide an overview of the military-political situation in the Central Asian region as it was caught by a new crisis in Afghanistan and as it is seen by both Russian and foreign experts. The fi rst section outlines positions and interests of the key regional and non-regional actors that have a signifi cant impact on the military-political situation in Central Asia. The second section examines the response of the Russian Federation to the situation in Afghanistan after the Taliban took power. Finally, the third section provides an overview of the latest expert comments and reports that attempt to assess possible implications of those events for the regional military-political dynamics and the national security interests of the Russian Federation.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is a good opportunity to assess its performance over the past two decades, to draw some conclusions, and to discuss possible future developments of the SCO. The author examines milestones in the formation of the SCO, its institutional structure, as well as its key activities which encompass four focal areas: politics, security, economy, and humanitarian cooperation. The paper focuses on the decisions of the 21st SCO Summit in Dushanbe, especially those aimed at strengthening cooperation in combating the eff ects of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and addressing security challenges, arising from the latest developments in Afghanistan. The latter particularly imply an increasing threat of terrorism, extremism, and drug traffi  cking from Afghanistan to neighboring countries in Central Asia. The author emphasizes the crucial role of the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) in countering these threats. Finally, the paper addresses both the circumstances and possible implications of Iran’s ascension to a full SCO member, which was approved during the summit in Dushanbe. The author concludes that over the past two decades the SCO has successfully transitioned from an important, yet regional in scope and framework, organization to an infl uential global actor, which plays a major role in the maintenance of peace and security in Central Asia and could serve as a model for the establishment of a new non-confrontational approach to the interstate relations.

The painful consequences of political, economic and social shocks provoked by the Arab Spring forced the political elites of the Middle Eastern states to revisit traditional approaches to maintaining stability and security in the region. 
This inevitably aff ected the activities of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which was from the outset established in order to enhance cooperation between the countries of the region primarily in the fi eld of security. This paper attempts to identify the key milestones, factors and trends that have shaped the GCC decision-making process in the security sphere over the past 10 years since the beginning of the Arab Spring. The author shows that the Arab Awakening has encouraged the GCC member-states to deepen military-political integration, aimed at strengthening their defense capabilities, as well as their abilities to respond to external and internal challenges. The author notes that the GCC countries still view Iran as the main source of all these threats; moreover, con-sidering substantial strengthening of Iran’s infl uence in the Middle East their position has even hardened. Tehran is accused of meddling in the internal aff airs of the GCC member-states, supporting illegal Shiite groups operating on their territory, and instigating religious discord. In this context, it is quite natural that the Iran’s nuclear programme is of particular concern to the GCC. At the same time, the author emphasizes, that although the GCC member-states declare common approach towards Iran, their practical actions can vary signifi cantly. In particular, it was Qatar which opposed an excessively hard-line approach towards Iran. This fact, as well as accusations against Doha of supporting terrorist and extremist groups, led to two crises that shook the GCC in the 2010s. However, the fact that these crises have been eventually settled shows that security issues still press regional actors towards strengthening the capacities of the GCC. 
Especially since military threats have been compounded by a new threat — of the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The author concludes that this new threat, which has already incited the GCC to promote cooperation in a health sector, will also strengthen the member-states’ focus on various nonmilitary challenges including epidemiological and environmental ones.

The paper examines the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the context of wider changes in the Middle East and in the Arab world triggered by the Arab Spring. The author argues that during this decade the Kingdom’s foreign policy has witnessed a fundamental transformation: the very essence of the Saudi foreign policy course has changed signifi cantly as the political es-tablishment has substantially revised its approaches to the country’s role in the region and in the world. Before 2011, Saudi Arabia — the land of the ‘Two Holy Mosques’ — positioned itself as a representative of the international Muslim community and in pursuing its foreign policy relied primarily on the religious authority and fi nancial capabilities. However, according to Saudi Arabia’s leaders, the Arab Spring has plunged the region into chaos and has bolstered the infl uence of various extremist groups and movements, which required a signifi cant adjustment of traditional political approaches. Saudi Arabia, more explicit than ever before, has declared itself as a nation state, as a regional leader possessing its own interests beyond the abstract ‘Muslim Ummah’. However, the author stresses that these new political ambitions do not imply a complete break with the previous practice. For example, the containment of Iran not only remains the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, but has become even more severe. The paper shows that it is this opposition to Iran, which is now justifi ed on the basis of protecting the national interests, that predetermines the nature and the specifi c content of contemporary Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy including interaction with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), approaches towards the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, combating terrorism, and relations with the United States. In that regard, the transformation of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has, on the one hand, opened up new opportunities for strengthening the Kingdom’s interaction with Israel, but, at the same time, has increased tensions within the framework of strategic partnership with the United States. The author concludes that currently Saudi Arabia is facing a challenge of diversifying its foreign policy in order to increase its international profi le and political subjectivity.

Digital diplomacy opens up new opportunities for both developed and devel-oping states to promote their international image, clarify their position on current issues, and realize long-term foreign policy aspirations, but it also brings com-pletely new challenges. The chief one among them is establishing a continuous constructive dialogue with the target audience in the virtual space. Facilitation for this dialogue is one of the key priorities of the digital diplomacy of Sweden. 
The author examines the activities of the key actors of Sweden’s digital diplomacy (the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Sweden, the Swedish Institute, the Swedish Tourist Association (Svenska Turistföreningen), ‘Visit Sweden’) and identifi es their key features. Particularly, the author emphasizes the government’s readiness to implement innovative and creative methods to promote its media projects. The latter include such projects as ‘The Second House of Sweden’, ‘Curators of Sweden’, and ‘Swedish Number’, which were aimed at improving the quality of communication with the foreign audience. In doing so, the responsible minis-tries and agencies placed a heavy emphasis on promoting a dialogue via social networks between the Swedish offi  cials and representatives of the civil society on the one hand and foreign users on the other. The leading actors of Sweden’s digital diplomacy actively engaged the foreign audience in discussions on the most important issues on the foreign policy agenda of Sweden. This was most clearly demonstrated in media campaigns designed to eliminate discrimination against women and gender-based violence. The author concludes that Sweden has achieved a certain degree of success in establishing a dialogue with the foreign audience, yet this dialogue is not comprehensive enough and still depends on the initiative of individual politicians and diplomats.

In the recent years debates surrounding the autonomous weapons systems development and regulation have gained a new momentum. Despite the fact that the development of such type of weapons continues since the twentieth century, recent technological advances open up new possibilities for development of completely autonomous combat systems that will operate without human in-tervention. In this context, international community faces a number of ethical, legal, and regulatory issues. This paper examines the ongoing debates in both the Western and the Russian expert community on the challenges and prospects for using lethal autonomous systems. The author notes that Russian and Western discourses on most of the issues have very much in common and diff erences are found mainly in the intensity of debates — in the West they are much more ac-tive. In both cases the most active debates focus around two issues: the potential implications of fully autonomous weapons systems including the unclear line of accountability, and the prospects for international legal regulation of the use of lethal autonomous weapons. Both the Russian and the Western experts agree that the contemporary international humanitarian law is unable to handle the challenges posed by aggressive development of the lethal autonomous weapons. 
All this points to the need to adapt the international humanitarian law to the new realities, which, in turn, requires concerted actions from leading states and international organizations.