30 years after the end of the Cold War, bipolar structure still dominates in the nuclear sphere, although certain nuclear powers are closing the gap with Russia and the United States in terms of strategic arsenals and the system of world politics in general is moving towards polycentrism. At the same time, as US-Russian relations continue to deteriorate against the backdrop of the ‘Ukrainian crisis’, the prospects for strategic dialogue after the expiration of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) are becoming increasingly vague. The absence of a new agreement in this field threatens to throw international relations back to the beginning of the Cold War, with all the ensuing consequences. To avoid such a scenario, not only the leaders of Russia and the United States should demonstrate political will, but other nuclear powers should also be included in the negotiation process, particularly China. In this regard, the history of the Cold War can provide valuable lessons. The author argues that bipolarity (even at its apex in the late 1950s — early 1970s) had never been an exclusive characteristic of international relations. On the basis of a number of historical cases, the paper demonstrates that during this period the superpowers constantly had to reckon with the ‘third power’ factor. The latter did not only influence the logic and dynamics of Soviet-American relations, but also to a large extent predetermined the direction and nature of their military development and planning. Indeed, it was the ‘third power’ factor, namely China, along with the achievement of strategic parity between the superpowers that became one of the main impulses to the establishment of the non-proliferation regime. In conclusion, the author focuses on yet another important lesson from the Cold War: the experience of arms control negotiations during that period suggests that the meetings of politicians should be preceded by joint brainstorming sessions with scholars from interested countries. In the current situation, representatives of the academic community should take the lead so that by the time the political climate eventually changes, there would already be coherent and viable options for nuclear arms control adapted to new realities. 

The study focuses on a set of issues related to the assessment of key trends in the development of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which has been raised in the research published by Russian academicians V.G. Baranovskii and V.V. Naumkin in 2018. The aim of this paper is to reexamine their estimates and forecasts in the light of recent developments and on this basis to take a fresh look at the future of the MENA region. To that end, the first section of the paper revisits the main findings of the 2018 research. It shows which of the global and regional trends outlined there have retained their relevance under modern conditions, and which ones need serious reappraisal. In particular, the authors note that the trend towards the universalization of regional political systems stemmed from their overall modernization is being increasingly counterbalanced by the revival of archaic socio-political practices. The recent developments in the region have had an even greater impact on the process of democratization and the globalization-regionalization dichotomy. The authors argue that these changes were not completely unforeseen; on the contrary, they were anticipated if one looks at them through the lens of neo-modernism. The second section analyzes current trends in regional development. It shows that though the most acute regional conflicts in the MENA region are gradually de-escalating, centrifugal tendencies are becoming more evident, as heterogeneity of political systems and regimes increases. In this context, the discourses of decolonization and neocolonialism, as well as symbolic politics in general, are gaining a whole new meaning. 

The Balkan region has traditionally been of particular importance for Russia, and currently Serbia remains one of the few European countries potentially exposed, due to ideological affinity, to the influence of Russia’s soft power. Memory policy is an important tool in creating and maintaining this affinity because it enables formulation of unifying historical narratives and shared vision of the key events in the common history, thereby providing underpinning for assessments of current developments and for creating an image of the desired future. However, it has its limits and boundaries, and this paper aims at assessing the strength of the Russian-Serbian mnemonic union. The research builds on the concept of ‘mnemonic diplomacy’, which refers to a set of techniques and methods for the affirmation, coordination and dissemination of certain historical narratives designed to support the state’s foreign policy activities. The author argues that the Russian-Serbian memory alliance is based primarily on common assessments of the events of World War II. The paper examines the key stages, internal and external drivers of this mnemonic union development, as well as identifies contradictions and conflicts inherent to this process. The author emphasizes that within the framework of the Russian-Serbian memory alliance both parties have always pursued their own goals. For instance, Serbia sought to use it to increase its weight in the Balkan and, more broadly, European politics, as well as to strengthen relations with its traditional geopolitical ally. For Russia, this mnemonic alliance acquired particular significance when the country’s leaders set a course for transforming the post-Cold War world order. However, it was exactly this new turn of Russia’s foreign policy whose most visible manifestation was the launch of the special military operation in Ukraine that dramatically complicated Serbia’s position, including that in the field of memory politics. At the same time it has revealed the limits of the Russian-Serbian mnemonic union. The author concludes that the effectiveness of mnemonic diplomacy and, more broadly, the very possibility of forming and maintaining mnemonic alliances, ultimately depend on a combination of objective factors, including close economic ties and mutual geopolitical interest. Pushed outside this comfort zone, complementary historical narratives built solely on the appeal to the common heritage quickly lose their power of attraction. 

International development cooperation and political risks for transnational business are two topics which have always drawn attention from specialists in international political economy. Each of these topics is studied by a dedicated subdiscipline with a specific terminology, strong analytical centers and influential peer-reviewed journals. Despite political risks had initially been associated with developing countries (and transition economies — after the Cold War), two distinctive research clusters have developed separately from one another — quite inexplicably. Drawing on the idea of immanent proximity of international development studies and political risk analysis, this paper develops the logic of blending their research agendas.
The first two sections formulate key presumptions meant to justify the conjugation of two topics. The first presumption is an acknowledgement of an engrained commercial motivation in any modality of development cooperation and the latter’s ability to serve as a tool to promote foreign economic interests. The second presumption emphasizes the existence of an indissoluble link between political risks for business with socio-economic and political development disbalances within and between countries. The final section identifies concrete dimensions of conjugation of two research agendas, such as: 1) conducting political risk assessments in the course of programming and implementing development projects; 2) examining the impact of political risk manifestations on provider countries’ ability to mobilize financial resources for international development; studying the practices of using different development cooperation tools to mitigate political risks for foreign economic activity — both through a direct and deliberate reduction of risk perceived by business and through an indirect impact on the environment where political risks are formed; 4) exploring the logic of emergence of new risk factors (of various types) in the course of implementing development cooperation policies. The conclusion argues for focusing on the reverse impact of new trends in international development cooperation on the parameters of political risks for international business from the Western and non-Western countries amidst the global turbulence, using all available sources of statistical data — conventional and unconventional. It also draws a step-by-step research plan and assesses the theoretical and policy relevance of obtaining anticipated results.

Public diplomacy remains one of the most dynamic and important areas of the modern US foreign policy. As such, the US public diplomacy, — its institutional structure, principles of functioning, key priorities, etc. — attracts increasing attention within both Russian and foreign academic literature. However, for a more complete understanding of the contemporary US public diplomacy specifics and prospects, it seems appropriate to try to fit it into a broader context of the evolution of the US political system in general. The first section of the paper identifies the major domestic political factors that determined the development of the US foreign policy mechanism, as well as the key stages of its evolution. The author argues that one of the key trends in the almost 250-year history of the American political system development was its gradual democratization, aimed to promote inclusion of a larger section of population in political processes. The second section examines the role of public diplomacy within the framework of the contemporary US foreign policy. The author notes that the latest developments in information and communication technologies have turned publicity and PR-campaigns into the most important factors of domestic political competition in the United States in the 21st century. The Internet and social networks have opened up virtually unlimited opportunities for political campaigning both inside and outside the state, giving a new impetus to the development of the US public diplomacy. At the same time, digital technologies have also generated new challenges, raising the problem of ensuring information security in the face of expansion of social networks. In this regard, the third section touches upon the issues of evaluating the effectiveness of the US public diplomacy. The author concludes that in terms of possible directions for further research the interactions between the United States and the EU countries which share common values are of particular importance. This may allow for a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of the US public diplomacy tools based on the institutions of a developed civil society. 

Widespread introduction of digital technologies into political communication practices has led to the emergence of a new phenomenon — digital political culture, — which not only has attracted the attention of academic community, but has literally burst into modern electoral processes in developed countries. In terms of systemic and comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon the works of the French school of communicativistics are of particular interest. The first section of the paper thoroughly examines the key research questions, approaches and assertions that form the substantive core of the French school. The authors note that French researchers generally share the view that digital technologies have not had a revolutionary impact on political communications; rather they have complemented the existing social practices. However, this caution about new technologies does not impede their active integration into the political processes of the Fifth Republic. In the second section, through the analysis of a number of electoral campaigns, the authors examine the practical aspects of formation of digital political culture in France. The authors refer to the findings of French experts who conclude that despite the importance of Big Data technologies for establishing communication with the electorate, their use is not a simple or linear process and does not guarantee automatic success. The third section analyzes modern digital communication strategies in electoral processes in France on the example of the 2017 presidential elections. Special attention is paid to the electoral campaigns of E. Macron and J.-L. Melenchon. The authors conclude that in full accordance with the provisions of the French school of communicativistics the specifics of interpersonal communication, party interaction and traditions, as well as other factors related to the etymology of culture and sociology of the organization retain their significance even with the introduction of digital technologies. Moreover, the latter could have considerable communication effects in politics only if they match with the existing culture and evolve along with it.