Strategic documents of the Russian Federation consider opportunities created by digital economy as one of the key factors capable of ensuring economic growth and national sovereignty as well as of stimulating production in all spheres of social and economic activities. However, the author stresses, that uncontrolled digitalization of economy can drastically increase its vulnerability to cyberthreats. In that context, it is necessary to address more specifically challenges and threats associated with the digitalization process in the economic sphere.

The paper examines key approaches to the definition of the phenomenon of ‘digital economy’ as well as the most promising directions for global information infrastructure development in general and its hardware/software elements in particular. The author notes that in this context the quest for the most effective management mechanisms of sociotechnological systems (STS) that make up the digital economy, is of special importance. At the same time one can observe a rapid expansion of cyberthreats realized by means of various infotechnological impacts. The paper provides a detailed analysis of the main types of cyberattacks and outlines their potential impact on critical infrastructures of the digital economy. The author emphasizes that the high level of interdependence of its elements significantly increases destructiveness of the so called chained effects of cyberattacks. In view of the impossibility of reaching complete protection of the digital economy from the cyberthreats resilience of the sociotechnological systems is of particular importance. Cybersustainability implies the ability of a system to perform its functions under successful attacks on its resources (probably less effectively within in a short period of time necessary to neutralize cyberthreats and their impacts).

Turning to the issue of ensuring cybersustainability of the emerging digital economy of the Russian Federation, the author examines the main types of system-destructing cyberattacks and highlights the steps taken by the Russian government to tackle these threats. The author concludes that it will impossible to achieve independence and resilience of the Russian information infrastructure without relevant capacity-building in science and technology as well as without training a new generation of S&T personnel.

The unique nature of cyberspace, characterized by interdependence between material and social objects as well as the complexity of its structures, urges leading actors of world politics to seek new strategies of organizing their activities within this area. In the European Union, cybersecurity issues are debated on the basis of the resilience category. In this context the latter is understood as a system’s ability to adjust to new challenges, flexibly respond to threats, and successfully recover after blows. Using a discourse analysis approach the authors examine the genesis of the resilience discourse and the logic of its development in the EU cybersecurity policy, reveal nuances of how this category is interpreted in official documents as well as point out difficulties regarding practical application of this category.

The authors trace a gradual evolution of the EU approach towards cybersecurity from the well-established definitions of cyberspace to the ecosystem terms and concepts, which are particularly relevant to the resilience-based concept of cybersecurity. Within this approach, the Internet is considered not as a static object but as a complex heterogeneous system where a state of security is inextricably linked to a state of insecurity.

There is no single and coherent definition of resilience in the EU official documents yet. Nevertheless, it is stressed that one can see a gradual transformation of the official discourse from purely technical definitions to inclusion of a wider range of socio-political factors. However, the EU official discourse on this issue remains highly controversial. This refers, for instance, to the lack of a unified understanding of the ‘cyberresilience’ and ‘cybersecurity’ concepts. The authors highlight a tendency towards increasing securitization of the cybersphere in the EU cybersecurity discourse, which might lead to the narrowing of the concept of ‘cyberresilience’ and its transformation into a common euphemism. At the same time the authors conclude that the EU itself is not interested in oversecuritization of the cybersphere, and thus the EU cybersecurity policy will eventually evolve towards resilience-based approaches.

Rapid development of the Internet technologies has brought both unprecedented opportunities for economic development and a number of dangers for international community. In the early 2000s, challenges and threats emanating from the cyberspace were prioritized by leading world powers. The United States were among the first to elaborate legal framework for cyberpolicy aiming at providing national security after terrorist attacks of 2001. As time passed, dozens of legislation acts were adopted, and a number of agencies and committees responsible for ensuring information security emerged. The article examines the evolution of the U.S. conceptual approaches to information security (cybersecurity of the U.S. official documents) during the presidency of George Bush Jr. (during his tenure in office, the first National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was accepted), Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The author traces priority changes that took place in this area as well as analyzes U.S. relationships with other major actors in the cybersphere, especially Russia and China. A particular attention is paid to the U.S. policy directed at ensuring security of critical information infrastructures (CII). The author emphasizes that, although a set of regulating document has been adopted, the security level of CII objects remains relatively low. In general, the analysis of national policy documents allowed the author to outline several tendencies, characterizing development of the U.S. policy in cybersphere in recent years. In particular, there is an increasing tendency towards unilateralism relating to the sanctions measures against particular countries and their companies. In this context, the cybersecurity issues are often considered not as an end in itself but as means of achieving wider goals of external and internal policy. The author concludes that the U.S. cybersecurity policy is reactive in nature, which directly affects its effectiveness.

Internal dynamics of the warfare and evolution of the general strategic situation in the period of WWII, limited by the German aggression against Poland, on the one hand, and the failure of ‘Barbarossa’ and the U.S. entry into the war, on the other hand, were not so straightforward, as it is sometimes presented in scholarly accounts. This paper underlines ambivalences, intrinsic to the international and strategic situation between September 1939 and December 1941, focusing on the two interdependent though not identical trends of ‘totalization’ and ‘globalization’ of the warfare. To operationalize these processes the author suggests 3 parameters for each of them. As for ‘totalization’, they are: the duration of the war (a short war versus a long war), the degree of economy militarization, the degree of violence and absence of limitation in the warfare. To describe ‘globalization’ of the war the criteria are as follows: the geographical scale, the number of participants and the relative role and place of neutral powers, and, finally, the degree of the ‘bipolarization’ in the form of the two opposing coalitions. This paper concludes that the picture of WWII during the period under research was not identical to its textbook image of the total and global military conflict. Though the elements of the ‘total war’ were evident even in the pre-war period and included the preparation of the powers for the long struggle, a partial militarization of the economies based on the ‘lessons’ of WWI, and the ideological and criminal aims of Nazism, these elements needed time to take their ‘final’ forms and could not be implemented on a click. Moreover, the unexpected successes of the German ‘blitzkriegs’, as it seemed at the epoch, could turn the war into a series of relatively short military campaigns which didn’t demand the ‘total mobilization’. The same dichotomy was evident in the ‘globalization’ of the warfare: though the war was not only European from the beginning, due to the participation of the British and French colonial empires, due to the extension of the warfare to the North and East Africa and the global nature of the naval warfare, there were significant barriers to its extension to the whole world. Some of the Great Powers — the USSR and the USA, first of all — were officially neutral, there were a lot of expectations of the compromise peace and nobody knew exactly the final composition of the opposing blocs.

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC) is one of the key regional organizations and its significance has only augmented in recent years. Meanwhile, the author emphasizes that both Russian and foreign academic literature on the topic lacks general works covering activities of the organization. This paper aims to partially fill this gap. It highlights specific features of political systems of the GCC states, the institutional structure and the main directions of this organization’s activity: from economics and finances to security and common defense policy. The author emphasizes that the GCC’s ability to adopt a joint position based on a compromise should be credited to the leaders of the member-states. However, the paper outlines a range of issues impeding effective realization of the goals proclaimed by the organization. Particularly, the author focuses on the differences of opinion among the GCC countries on military cooperation and transformation of the organization into a full-fledged alliance. The Arab Awakening became another major challenge for all states of the Gulf. The paper examines how the ruling regimes of the GCC states were forced to respond to the unfurling of the wave of popular protests in their countries. Nevertheless, the author stresses that the GCC states managed to prove solidity of their political regimes, and the organization as a whole increased its impact in the region. Finally, the paper dwells on the events of the so called Qatar crisis, resulting from the discontent among the majority of GCC states with Qatar, which they accuse of supporting terrorist organizations. The author concludes that the Qatar crisis has demonstrated that national interests and the desire to maintain national sovereignty tend to have preference in the policy of the Gulf States over the common goals of the GCC. However, the GCC leaders strive to revive the spirit of cooperation and since the GCC members are interested in strengthening their cooperation, the organization could meet the challenges it has faced.

The article examines the impact of Brexit on the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain. Throughout preceding decades, this relationship was marked by stability and unprecedented high level of political, military, economic and financial cooperation. On the basis of quantitative analysis of the U.S. and British databases of international treaties, the authors provide a comparative analysis of the dynamic of bilateral relationship between the two countries from 1940 to 2017, as well as of their relations with the leading European powers — France and Germany. The authors also examine a wide range of agreements which laid a formal basis for the special relationship in such spheres as military and technical cooperation as a whole and nuclear cooperation in particular, intelligence, trade, taxation, scientific and industrial cooperation. It is concluded that this extensive treaty framework renders bilateral relations more coherent and stable, but at the same time it reveals their asymmetric nature which made the United Kingdom follow the U.S. foreign policy strategy. However, the analysis of bilateral relations in the context of the British withdrawal from the EU allowed the authors to shed a new light on the essence and the prospects for the special relationship. The authors conclude that, in the medium-term, military and economic cooperation will continue since it is based on the objective interests of both sides. The U.S. needs British military bases and investment while the UK needs American technologies, especially in the nuclear sphere, and investment alike. Simultaneously, one cannot exclude changes in the longer term. The United States as the leader of the Western world expect Great Britain not only to follow its policy but to support it, i.a. by maintaining a high level of military spending. In turn, the UK new foreign policy, articulated in Global Britain strategy, may come into conflict with the U.S. interests while lack of military spending can diminish the UK role in ensuring transatlantic security. This may have a negative impact on the bilateral dialogue.

The paper focuses on tensions within the ruling Conservative and Unionist Party of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over its membership in the European Union, which acquired a whole new dimension in the context of Brexit. The case of the Conservative Party is of special interest in this regard not only because it has been the ruling party since 2010 and determines the main directions of the domestic and foreign policies of the state, but also because it is considered to be the most Eurosceptic of all traditional European political parties. However, even the quick overview of the official party documents from 2010–2016 referring to the relations with the EU, clearly shows that Tory lacked unity on that matter. Alongside with the Eurosceptics, who advocated a substantive revision of the EU-UK relations, up to their complete severance, there was a strong faction of the so-called integrationists, who emphasized economic benefits from the continuation of membership in the EU. This split has only worsened after the Brexit referendum and the start of negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The ensuing debates have revealed four factions within the Conservative Party. The first faction includes politicians who strongly support Brexit even without a new deal with the EU. The second faction supports Brexit but insists on a new and better deal with the EU. The third group fully supports T. May’s policy. And, finally, the fourth faction opposes the very idea of Brexit and backs for the second Brexit referendum. This split within the ranks of the Conservative Party, compounded by further polarization of electorate and the rise of non-system parties, poses new challenges for the Tory leaders and their decisions will influence not only domestic and foreign policies of the state, but, to a large extent, the development of international relations in Europe in general.