The paper examines the phenomenon of global social protests that spread in 2019 across more than 20 countries. The author considers the most striking manifestations of this phenomenon that occurred in the Middle East, North Africa, Western Europe, and Asia. The paper provides a periodization of several waves of anti-globalization movement in the 21st century, whereby the current global unrest represents the third wave. The author identifies specific features of each stage and outlines a growing trend towards politicization and exacerbation of violence. Particular emphasis is made on how the protests in Latin America developed in time and space, as they spread to at least eight states of the region: Haiti, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Columbia. In each country, protests were triggered by a peculiar set of internal factors which are not susceptible to easy generalization. In order to come nearer to the understanding of the new global phenomenon the author puts forward several socio-philosophical hypotheses. In particular, the possibility of internationalization of the French ‘yellow vests’ movement, its transfer and adaptation to other countries affected by protests, is noted. In that regard the paper outlines certain ‘channels’ for exporting the French protests to Latin America, including migration and cultural ties. The author stresses that although socio-economic explanations of the global protest phenomenon that focus on such issues as the growth of inequality and social polarization, are correct, they are insufficient for a comprehensive understanding of the new and complex phenomenon. As an alternative, the author suggests using the concept of ‘social singularity’. The paper considers the key features of this concept, including the idea that contemporary global social sphere is functioning in an online mode, allowing for increased speed of social interaction and communication on a global scale. Finally, the paper examines the causes and the development of the social unrest that broke out in Ecuador and served as a starting point for escalating the protest movement in Latin America in 2019.

Latin America and the Caribbean region (LAC), which includes more than thirty countries, is traditionally characterized by a complex combination of elements of homogeneity and heterogeneity. The latter, stemming from traditional economic social and political differentiation and ideological polarization, in the modern context strengthens regional contradictions and creates new division lines. At the same time, the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries was marked by a growing integration of the region into the global market and globalization processes in general. In order to provide an outlook on the possible future developments in LAC, the author examines how the key trends of the current world politics permeate the region. The theoretical framework of the paper is based on the methodology proposed by the Russian researcher M.M. Lebedeva who outlines three basic megatrends — globalization, integration, and democratization and their counter-trends — deglobalization, disintegration, and dedemocratization, accordingly. It is within this broader context of a complex interplay of these trends and counter-trends, that the dynamics of regional processes in LAC is conceived. On this basis, the author identifies three possible regional development scenarios. The first one presupposes strengthening of institutional linkages between North, Central, and South America on the basis of Pan-American ideas. The second implies civilizational ‘isolation’ of LAC within large but still only regional integration projects. Finally, the third scenario proceeds from the linear development of the current regional trends. It implies further fragmentation of LAC within subregional organizations and chaotization of regional international relations. The author concludes that currently the regional development is affected predominantly by counter-trends, which are evidenced by increasing isolationism, an impasse facing major integration projects and democratic institutions, and the growth of populist movements. At the same time, all this shows that Latin America is fully integrated in global economic and political processes since these counter-trends characterize the development of a contemporary system of international relations in general.

The paper examines a complex web of domestic and external issues which have both provoked a systemic crisis in Venezuela and, at the same time, determined its specificity in comparison with the wave of protests sweeping across Latin America in 2019.

The authors conclude that the escalation of the conflict in Venezuela was caused not only by the standoff between the legislative and the executive branches of the government, but also by the split of the whole society into proponents and opponents of ‘socialism of the 21st century’. The contradictions have led to the formation of the parallel branches of power: two presidents, two parliaments and two supreme courts (one of them in exile) which de facto coexist in the country and each claims exclusive rights and legitimacy.

The authors also stress that the situation in Venezuela has obvious regional consequences. The miscalculations of the incumbent president were used in election campaigns in other Latin American countries and became one of the reasons for the defeat of left candidates, the subsequent ‘right drift’ leading to the isolation of the republic. The new political landscape has also affected the architecture of integration associations, which failed to develop a unified position toward the Bolivarian regime.

Furthermore, in a current heightened state of international tensions Venezuela has turned into a theatre of international rivalry and conflict involving all the key subjects of world politics. The United States, China, Russia and the European Union compete for the energy resources of the country and pursue their own strategic interests. The inability or unwillingness of external forces to reach compromise and to bring the parties to the negotiating table can pose a threat to peace and international security.

As a result, Venezuela has become one of the most turbulent countries in the region. At the same time, the repeated outbursts of protest waves are significantly different from popular uprisings in other Latin American states. In the worst-case scenario, a constantly worsening situation may result in a social explosion which threatens to make the Bolivarian Republic another hot spot of the planet.

The Chilean development model by objective parameters is a combination of a developed democracy, a targeted social policy, and an effective, competitive economy. However, the protest movement that began in October 2019, which included both peaceful and violent actions, was directed not only against the center-right government of Sebastian Pinera (2018–2022), but also against the entire system as a whole. This movement demonstrated the disillusionment and dissatisfaction of the broad social strata with the results of political and social development and indicated the beginning of a protracted, intractable crisis.

The fundamental reason for the protests was a deep contradiction between economic efficiency and social justice, laid down during the neoliberal modernization of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990), and not overcome during the 30 years of democratic development, despite a large-scale social policy. The system of ‘elite compromises’, which provided a political basis for the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, also became an object of harsh criticism.

The paper shows the specifics of the Chilean model in historical retrospect, identifies contradictions and issues that have triggered a socio-political conflict, particularly the rise of mass social expectations, strengthened by the reforms of the second government of M. Bachelet (2014–2018), and considers the features of the current crisis.

A protest wave which began in 2019 has swept across many Latin American countries. The Multinational State of Bolivia, where rapid destabilization of political situation has led to a serious internal crisis, was no exception. The paper examines the prospects for conflict resolution in Bolivia through the lens of the ‘divided society’ concept. The first section identifies the key fault lines in Bolivia including ethnic, cultural, and civilizational differences, economic disproportions, and high levels of social and political polarization. The author shows how the regime of Evo Morales managed to reach an internal balance and maintain it for quite a long time through complex balancing, concessions, and compromises. The second section identifies the causes behind the 2019 crisis. These include miscalculations of the government which has revealed general instability of the country’s political system and threatened to erode democratic institutions; changes in electoral behavior of the population; the increasing role of the armed forces. The author links the possibilities to overcome these challenges faced by Bolivia with the expansion of the social protection in conjunction with the principle of consociationalism, but stresses that even so the consolidation of the Bolivian society will be a time-consuming process.

The paper examines the dynamics of social protests in Lebanon from October 2019 till March-May 2020 when the government imposed unprecedentedly rigorous restrictive measures to combat the spread of COVID-19 infection. The paper identifies the underlying causes of the protests. The author stresses that from the very beginning socio-economic demands of protestors addressed to the executive power (particularly, to grapple with the rising income inequality) were accompanied by calls for democratization on the secular principles and elimination of political confessionalism. At the same time, the author outlines certain specifics of popular uprisings in Lebanon that distinguish them from simultaneous protests in other countries, namely their supra-ethnic, supra-religious and non-partisan character and their remarkable coherence and coordination, given the lack of overall leadership. The author emphasizes that the subsequent change of government has not brought, however, significant changes the protestors hoped for. The new Cabinet was not free from traditional confessional and political bias, whereas legal and administrative measures undertaken by the new government to combat the pandemic were, apparently, also aimed at ‘freezing’ the current situation favorable for both the parliamentary majority and the government. In particular, the recent laws and regulations reflect the Government’s desire to prevent the resumption of protests equivalent to those of the fall of 2019. All these measures did not face serious resistance, even though the economic situation of the population has worsened, and many people have lost their livelihoods. However, the fear of the COVID-19 has proved to be a more efficient means of preventing protests than any punitive measure. The author concludes that the dynamics of inter-party competition even under strict quasi-quarantine measures shows that the hopes of protestors for a genuine transition from a traditional clan and confessional structure of the Lebanese political system to the standards and principles of a developed democracy proved futile.