Eurasia is gradually turning into the point of intersection of various longterm political and economic initiatives undertaken by the leading actors of contemporary international relations, including the Russian Federation, the European Union, the United States and the People’s Republic of China. This trend compounded by a complicated dynamics of integration and disintegration processes in the post-Soviet states further exacerbates tensions in the region, already fraught with conflict. It also poses additional obstacles to the projects of Eurasian integration, promoted by the Russian Federation. In order to provide a better understanding of the specificities and prospects of Russia’s initiatives, the paper examines the origins and the evolution of the Russian strategy of Eurasian integration, and identifies its key elements. The author concludes that fundamental principles of the Russian strategy for reshaping the post-Soviet states have been laid down during the presidency of B.N. Yeltsin and were merely adjusted to meet certain political, social and economic changes both in Russia and abroad. These principles include: 1) commitment to the idea of a multipolar world; 2) creation of supranational Eurasian economic institutions to multiply the economic potential of member-states; 3) prevention of a change of political regimes in neighboring countries if they can bring to power anti-Russian groups; 4) establishment of closer links with China, especially on political, economic and security issues; 5) formation of a new center of political gravity in Eurasia through expanding the capacities of regional political and military organizations which would complement integration processes and ensure regional security. The paper shows that amid growing international tensions in the second half of 2010s the Russian integration initiatives have become increasingly focused on geostrategic, political and military issues. In that regard, the author concludes that, although the development of the Eurasian integration projects enables a wide range of horizontal and vertical economic linkages between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) memberstates, overtly competitive nature of both the Russian and the Western states’ strategies increases the conflict potential of the region. In the absence of alternative approaches, this conflict could not only become a potential source of new tensions between Russia and the West, but also threatens to reverse the current integration processes within the EAEU. The author emphasizes that the abandonment of excessively politicized and ideologized policies both in Russia and in the Western states, which prevents political elites from finding compromises and developing alternative approaches, is the only way to improve the situation in the Eurasian region.

Dynamics of economic development in Asia in the first two decades of the 21st century can be visualized schematically as a series of waves with different focuses of economic activities of regional powers and prevailing regional economic agenda. The first decade of this century was marked by an increasing number of bilateral free trade agreements, the establishment of ASEAN+1 free trade zones and very general in nature discussions on the prospects for the establishment of a large regional integration block. The US ‘Pivot to Asia’ has promoted transformation of these abstract discussions into substantive debates on parameters and principles of a broader regional trading and economic cooperation arrangement. The second wave in the development of economic processes in Asia (from 2010 to 2017) was characterized by a ‘soft’ rivalry between the US and China for setting the priority model of economic integration in the region (Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership vs. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and for establishing rules of a regional trade and investment system. The third wave followed the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative and AIIB, which expanded the focus of the regional countries’ activities from trade liberalization to promoting regional infrastructure development and connectivity. The author aims to assess the role of the Belt and Road and AIIB initiatives in consolidating China’s position in Asia, as well as their potential impact on the regional economic architecture. The first section outlines economic processes in China and in the region in general, which provided a context for establishing the Belt and Road and AIIB initiatives. The second and third sections examine their impact on regional economic processes and on the PRC’s regional positions. The author accentuates substantive changes that these initiatives underwent in 2013-2019 and identifies their intermediate outcomes. The author concludes that the Belt and Road and AIIB initiatives reflect the PRC’s intent to convert its growing economic and financial capabilities into regional influence. The establishment of new multilateral financial institutions, development of new rules governing trade, investment and economic activities, adoption of new production and technical standards, transformation of the regional transport and logistics system, development of new value chains, and other outcomes of foreign economic activities of China already has the potential to reshape the regional economic architecture.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the U.S. and the EU could have become a milestone of the 2010s transforming the current global governance system and the strategic balance of power as well as having a direct impact on the economy and trade. Nevertheless, the negotiations launched in 2013 reached a stalemate and were effectively frozen in January 2017. Although assessments of the new mega bloc’s impact on the U.S. and the EU economies diverged, such a development seems all the more unexpected given that most researchers and politicians advocating the initiative emphasized its geopolitical significance for the West in the face of China’s rise. A question inevitably arises: what can account for the freeze of negotiations? Was it the result of Donald Trump’s election, who was a vocal critic of his predecessor’s legacy during his election campaign? Or are there underlying objective reasons? In order to shed light on the issue it is necessary to analyse the differences that emerged during the fifteen rounds of negotiations as well as to examine the most recent developments in transatlantic trade and economic relations. Trump’s foreign policy sought to advance U.S. national interests in such a way that resulted in weakening multilateral elimination of tariff s for industrial goods and for an agreement on conformity assessment. However, negotiations of the former agreement did not start a year after the Joint Statement had been adopted; there were three meetings of the Executive Working Group focusing on regulatory issues. Apparently, an agreement similar to TTIP in scope is unlikely to be concluded in the near future. It also becomes evident that the parties’ divergent goals and interests at the negotiations rather than subjective factors, such as Donald Trump’s approach, are the main reason for that. Continuing dialogue between the U.S. and the EU on specific issues, e.g. regulation, seems a more viable scenario. Keywords: U.S., EU, trade negotiations, TTIP, transatlantic trade, globalisation, global governance, economic diplomacy, industrial goods, conformity assessment, regulation, tariff and non-tariff barriers.institutions: in 2018 the EU and a number of states became targets of U.S. aluminium and steel tariff s purportedly imposed to protect national security. These unilateral measures turned into leverage ahead of negotiations. In June 2018 the U.S. and the EU issued a Joint Statement: the parties agreed to ‘work together toward zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods.’ In April 2019 the Council of the European Union adopted two decisions authorising the opening of negotiations of an agreement with the United States of America on the elimination of tariff s for industrial goods and for an agreement on conformity assessment. However, negotiations of the former agreement did not start a year after the Joint Statement had been adopted; there were three meetings of the Executive Working Group focusing on regulatory issues. Apparently, an agreement similar to TTIP in scope is unlikely to be concluded in the near future. It also becomes evident that the parties’ divergent goals and interests at the negotiations rather than subjective factors, such as Donald Trump’s approach, are the main reason for that. Continuing dialogue between the U.S. and the EU on specific issues, e.g. regulation, seems a more viable scenario.

 Japan’s Arctic strategy, particularly its geopolitical and economic aspects, has been thoroughly reviewed by both Russian and foreign experts. However, the structures and mechanisms behind this strategy remain somewhat obscure. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap by resorting to the study of the Japanese Arctic lobby. The authors identify the key interest groups which stand for an active Arctic policy and for cooperation with the Russian Federation in that regard. These include, in particular, the energy sector representatives that sought to take part in the construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. The decision of the Japanese government to join the Western anti-Russian sanctions disrupted these plans. However, the adoption of S. Abe’s 8-points plan in 2016 opened up new opportunities for the Russia-Japan Arctic cooperation. Yet another two groups of interest are equally interested in strengthening bilateral relations — shipping and ship-building industries. They also suffered from anti-Russian sanctions but now they are actively engaged in the construction of the LNG jetties near Murmansk and in Kamchatka. There is also a growing interest towards the Arctic region within the fishery industry — a very important sector of Japan’s economy. Cooperation with Russia increases Tokyo’s capacity to participate in the creation of international legal regime of fisheries in the Central Arctic ocean. Finally, the authors identify another important element of the Japanese Arctic lobby — regional elites. In that regard, they examine activities of the Hokkaido prefecture to engage in development of the Northern Sea Route. The paper examines the key mechanisms used by the Arctic lobby to influence the authorities, including sectoral, regional and national business associations, research and educational centers and mass media, as well as ‘built-in lobby’ in relevant ministries and agencies responsible for making and implementing Tokyo’s Arctic policies. The authors conclude that, although the Arctic lobby is unable to persuade the Government to remove anti-Russian sanctions altogether, elaboration of a selective strategy of cooperation with the Japanese business community could strengthen bilateral relations and provide new opportunities for exploiting natural resources of the Far North and developing the Russian Arctic.

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.

The paper examines views of the President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari on the development of the Russian-Finnish relations in 1994–2000. This issue has been thoroughly studied by both Russian and Western scholars, both in terms of bilateral relations and within a broader framework of Finland’s foreign policy in a post-bipolar world. This paper, however, attempts to address the issue from the perspective of a cognitive approach. According to the author, this approach may not only provide insights on the models of thinking of M. Ahtisaari, who played a key role in the formation of Finland’s foreign policy in 1994–2000, but also to reassess the dominant views by placing them within a new theoretical framework. To this end, the paper provides a cognitive mapping of a sample of speeches and articles written by the President of Finland in 1994–2000. The author identifies the most significant and pronounced themes specific to M. Ahtisaari’s foreign policy discourse, and establishes causal links between them. On that basis the author creates a cognitive map which in turn makes it possible to detect the central causal line: a set of closely related themes and ideas which provided a general framework that defined president Ahtisaari’s views on policy towards Russia. The subsequent analysis of the cognitive map reveals a hierarchical system of the key objectives and determinants in the M. Ahtisaari foreign policy agenda setting. The cognitive mapping shows that during M. Ahtisaari’s presidency the main goal of Finland’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation was to promote peace and security in Europe in general and in the Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region in particular. In that regard special attention was paid to the Northern Dimension programme. It was considered as a primary means of the EU-Russia rapprochement aimed at enhancing political dialogue and increasing economic cooperation between them, as well as at promoting reforms in the post-Soviet Russia.

In academic discourse, public diplomacy is often regarded as an instrument of foreign policy most suitable for small states, which enables them to compensate for the lack of military and economic capabilities. Paradoxically enough, studies on public diplomacy usually focus on the activities of the leading actors of world politics. However, it is exactly the case of small states that, according to the author, allows better understanding of the role of public diplomacy in the contemporary foreign policy agenda. The author examines the evolution of the Slovak public diplomacy, and distinguishes two stages in it. The firststage (from 1993 to 2004) was characterized by the establishment and consolidation of the Slovak system of public diplomacy, aimed primarily at promoting the main goal of the government — the country’s integration into the European Union. By means of advocacy and cultural diplomacy, in particular through the system of Slovak Institutes, Slovakia tried to convince politicians, journalists, members of the academic and business communities, and non-governmental organization activists in Europe that the country was ready to join the EU. During the second stage (from 2005 to the present day) a national branding, aimed at promoting a positive image of the country has come to play (along with cultural diplomacy) one of the key roles within the Slovak public diplomacy. It was at this time that the government initiated the National Scholarship Program of the Slovak Republic and launched an information campaign with the slogan ‘Slovakia is a Good Idea’, which had made a significant contribution to the dissemination of accurate information about the country and strengthened relations with the neighboring states and trade partners. The author concludes that in nearly three decades Slovakia has managed to establish a modern competitive system of public diplomacy, which possesses the following characteristics: a high level of coordination between the key actors, a wide range of working methods, and an effective dialogue with the people of the country on the main foreign policy objectives (domestic public diplomacy).

In 2020 the whole world commemorated the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II — the most horrifi c war in the human history. However, the celebration of the victory over fascism was overshadowed by the growing tension among the leading actors of contemporary international relations. In this context, a high level of responsibility falls on the academic community to rebuff politically motivated attempts to rewrite history and revise the outcomes of this war. The book under review could make an important contribution to that end. The book provides a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the history of World War II. The reviewer emphasizes that rather than providing a detailed examination of military operations the authors focused on their impact on the development of the international relations system. In particular, the book provides a detailed picture of the complex interactions within the strategic triangle — the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain — both during the war and in the years after the war. As a result, the book under review not only provides an opportunity to better understand the key trends in relationships between the Great Powers during the war, but also sheds new light on the origins of the bipolar system and the beginning of the Cold War. The reviewer concludes that, despite sometimes excessively Eurocentric approach of the authors, this book is a seminal work on the history of World War II and a major event for the Russian academic community. As such, this book can be recommended to both professional historians and a wider audience.