By the beginning of the 2010s, the powerful positive impetus inherent to the Russia-Western relations in the energy sector has waned. Substantial disagreements arose on all major issues of the agenda, from the views on the prospects for the Russian fuel and energy complex development and participation of foreign capital in it, to the implementation of concrete gas transportation projects and to assessments of opportunities for legal and institutional regulation of energy relations in Europe and the world. The Russian military operation in Ukraine in 2022 has greatly exacerbated all these tensions, rendering virtually impossible any form of cooperation in the energy sector. These circumstances raise questions about the driving forces, ideological imperatives, and the very logic of the energy policy development both in Russia and the West. The present paper compares two different interpretations of these issues based on insights from the realist and liberal theoretical frameworks. The first section highlights basic theoretical and methodological premises of these approaches in general and outlines their potential application to the energy issues in particular. Then the author assesses the explanatory potential of each of these approaches with regard to the key issues in relations between Russia and the West in the energy sector. The author admits that many steps taken by Russia, as well as the US and the EU can be well explained from the viewpoint of liberal approach (e.g. attempts of some EU countries to depoliticize energy cooperation with Russia or the EU measures to prevent monopolization of its energy market by Gazprom). However, political realism provides a more compelling explanation of previous dynamics of international relations in this field, their current state and prospects. The policy of energy transition, implemented by Western countries to lower their carbon dependence, fits particularly well the logic of the realist approach, although potential tensions between Russia and the West in that regard have not yet fully materialized.

Energy cooperation was one of the cornerstones of the European Union–Rus- sia relations and, in turn, was, to a large extent, shaped by the progress of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, which developed from 2000 to 2014. On the basis of a consistent critical analysis of official sources, the paper identifies internal and external determinants of the Russia-EU Energy Dialogue and assesses its general logic and dynamics, as well as its key outcomes. The author concludes that in the first five years of the Energy Dialogue it was the European Union who acted as its driving force, as the EU sought not only to ensure the supplies of Russian energy resources, but also to take control over their production and transporta- tion. A careful comparison of the Russia-EU Energy Dialogue key dimensions and the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty allowed the author to identify yet another aim of the European Union, namely, to impose on Moscow the prin- ciples of a common European energy policy. However, these efforts encountered strong opposition from the Russian government. From 2006–2007 the conflict of interests had become all the more evident, as considerable changes took place both in the internal energy policy of Moscow and Brussels and Russia’s inter- national position. As a result, the content and structure of the Energy Dialogue changed: discussions on the creation of a single energy community and energy markets were overshadowed by issues of strategic planning and development of an early warning mechanism. Therefore, by 2014, when the EU abandoned the Energy Dialogue, its potential had been to a large extent exhausted. Nevertheless, the Dialogue provided Russia with extensive experience in interacting with the European Commission as a supranational body of the EU, and this experience might be in demand in the future.

In recent years, Germany’s energy policy has been pursuing several long-term goals: not only to ensure energy security, but also to achieve energy transition and to become a major gas hub in the European Union. In that context, cooperation with Russia as a key exporter of natural gas to Germany was of particular importance. At the same time, relations between the two states showed contradictory dynamics. This became especially evident during the political struggle over the project of the new Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. The author traces the evolution of the arguments of the key participants in the discussions sparked by the project in Germany before Russia began its special military operation in Ukraine and after it. The first section examines the positions of the main interest groups, leading political parties and regional authorities. The author shows that representatives from the business community and political forces related to them (SPD, CSU, part of the CDU and FDP) were generally inclined to support the project, albeit under certain conditions. The latter particularly included Russia’s guarantees for preserving gas transit through Ukraine. The human rights (legalist) group and eco-activists, affiliated with the Greens, partly the CDU and the FDP, took a much more critical stand regarding Nord Stream 2. Moreover, the federal government’s policy was greatly affected by a number of external factors. Germany made significant diplomatic efforts not only to coordinate its position with other EU countries, but also to overcome the resistance to the project from the United States and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the German government eventually managed through various compromises to advance the Nord Stream 2 project. The situation has changed dramatically after Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic. The German government halted the process of certification of Nord Stream 2. All major German political parties supported this decision.

Since the middle of 2010s, international community (developed economies primarily) has been paying increasing attention to the reduction of carbon footprint in the environment by means of large-scale deployment of renewable energy, electrification of transport system and sustainable production of goods. Aspiring to become a global leader of energy transition, the United States of America has already taken a set of measures to stimulate technological growth. Such a challenging task cannot be accomplished without a guaranteed access to the so-called critical minerals. However, the US has encountered growing competition from China in this field. From the beginning of 2000s, China has amassed within its territory a dominant share of global production of critical minerals, acquired access to key foreign extraction centers and thus become virtually a monopolist in the markets. Hence the United States government urgently needs to devise measures to overcome the dependence from China in this regard. The author of the article dwells on the factors which have made the issue of critical minerals (as a recent development of international relations) relevant and politically charged. In its turn, it has led to the securitization of the subject in American official discourse during Trump administration which manifested itself in the ‘mineral security’ concept. The article contains comparative analysis of Trump and Biden administration approaches to navigating the country out of the dependence from China for critical minerals; it also identifies key focus areas of the current US mineral strategy. Respective analysis indicates that Trump administration prioritized bolstering domestic extraction capacity, whereas Biden-Harris administration underscores processing and production segments, mostly due to the pressure from local communities and environmental groups. The author stresses that the Unites States, being unable to contest China’s monopoly as producer and supplier of critical minerals with market instruments, tends to employ human rights discourse to compete with its rival. The ultimate expression of such an approach is Energy Resource Governance Initiative which has been designed to foster high ecological and social standards in global extraction sector. Relying on its partners, the United States intends to use the program to challenge China in commodity markets. The author concludes that despite the effort Washington won’t be able to rid itself of the dependence for Chinese imports in the near future. As for the long-term goals, their achievement is complicated due to both China’s production capacity and experience and insufficient government funding of renewable energy projects in the United States.

Nowadays the socio-economic and political agenda of almost all countries of the Arab East includes the issues of sustainable development and green energy. The natural conditions of the region and its vulnerability to natural disasters prioritize the issues of environmental security and transition to renewable energy sources. The research has two objectives. Firstly, the authors attempt to outline prospects for enhancing capacities in clean energy production and replacing traditional energy sources that emerged in recent years in the Arab countries. Secondly, the paper assesses challenges and limits for green practices dissemination, as well as their capabilities of providing environmental security for the countries in the region. The authors note that an alternative approach to power generation is gradually taking root in the region and, judging by the scale of major projects being implemented, it has good prospects, especially in the field of solar energy. At the same time, despite the advantages of such projects, they have serious economic and technological constraints including pricing issues, problems of energy storage and waste disposal. However, the authors emphasize that the main obstacle to a coherent and effective climate policy for the entire Arab East stems from strong disproportions in economic development of the regional actors. The article thoroughly examines the experience of the most advanced Arab countries in the areas of renewable energy — the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The authors note that these countries actively experiment with all known renewable energy sources, including hydrogen-based, but at the same time, they are seeking to develop nuclear power. However, their ambitious projects do not reflect the real situation in the region as a whole, where most countries are extremely cautious in making risky, expensive decisions on energy and climate policy. They are not ready to unconditionally adopt Western approaches to ‘greening’ economy and take a wait-and-see attitude. This may explain certain inertia towards renewable energy sources that is shown by most countries of the Arab East.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela faces a deep political and economic crisis that is exacerbated by severe restrictive measures imposed against it by the United States and their allies. In these circumstances, the availability of external economic support becomes particularly important. In recent years, Russia has become one of the key donors for Venezuela with a wide range of economic diplomacy tools at its disposal. Drawing upon official data, as well as recent findings of Russian and foreign researchers, the present paper examines the evolution of Russian economic diplomacy towards Venezuela during the presidency of H. Chavez (1999–2013) and N. Maduro (2013 — present). The author emphasizes that bilateral economic cooperation was already institutionalized under H. Chavez. The most intense interaction took place in the energy and military-technical fields. The mechanisms of Russian economic diplomacy included primarily public and private loans, investments, and payments for the permission to develop Venezuelan oil deposits. The election N. Maduro was accompanied by a dramatic deterioration of political and economic situation in the country. The crisis was further aggravated by economic sanctions imposed by the US. The latter also affected Russian projects in the republic. However, Russia continued to provide significant support to Venezuela, both through already proven mechanisms of economic diplomacy and a number of new ones, including sovereign debt restructuring and advance delivery of goods. At the same time, the author notes that this assistance remains rather isolated and limited, it affects only specific areas, mainly oil and gas and military-technical cooperation, and its volume is insufficient to effectively address the economic crisis in Venezuela. In this context, the domestic economic policy of the Venezuelan government is of particular importance. Indeed, liberal economic reforms carried out since 2018 were helpful for recovery from the economic crisis. In this connection, the author provides a list of measures and mechanisms Russia could implement in the framework of economic diplomacy to ensure this positive trend.