The concept of ‘triangular diplomacy’, introduced by Henry Kissinger during the Cold War, acknowledged the specific character of relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China. It was designed to establish such a balance of power that the USA would consistently maintain a strategic advantage by exploiting the differences between the other two vertices of the strategic triangle. In contemporary conditions, the interaction within the new Russia–U.S.–China strategic triangle acquired particular significance given the reconfiguration of international relations and the shaping of a polycentric world order. The author posits that the reinstatement of President Trump in 2025may give a qualitatively new meaning to the ‘Kissinger Doctrine’, with Moscow potentially acting as the counterweight within the Russia–China–U.S. configuration. To substantiate this hypothesis, this study identifies the key stages and determinants in the evolution of the ‘Kissinger’s triangle’ from the 1970s onward. It demonstrates that while the USA was the primary beneficiary of this trilateral dynamic during the Cold War, this balance gradually shifted to the advantage of China during the post-bipolar period, albeit with some reservations. The latter benefited from its cooperation with both Russia and the United States as their bilateral relations were steadily deteriorating. However, current developments indicate that Russia may now be poised to become the ‘counterbalance’ within this framework. The following factors support this conclusion: (1) a generally favorable background following the high-level Russian-American negotiations; (2) the significant potential of Russian-Chinese cooperation and convergence of the two countries’ positions on a wide range of international issues; and (3) the intensification of D. Trump’s efforts to contain China. Together, these factors could create new opportunities for Moscow to strengthen its international standing, including resolving the Ukrainian crisis and restoring the dialogue on nuclear arms control.

From the outset of his second presidential term, Donald Trump proclaimed a fundamental reassessment of Washington’s foreign policy priorities, explicitlyasserting the primacy of the U.S. national interests over the globalist objectives of maintaining the world order. This discourse has drawn strong criticism from advocates of the so-called liberal international order, traditionally associated with the Democratic Party, who accuse D. Trump of neo-isolationism, of sacrificing principled policy positions for transactionalism, and of undermining the foundations of America’s global leadership. Central to this debate is the concept of the ‘rules-based international order’, championed by liberal internationalists yet explicitly rejected by the Trump’s administration. To better understand the true nature of Washington’s contemporary foreign policy, this article examines the evolution of the ‘rules-based order’ concept, identifies the core elements of the ‘America First’ narrative advocated by the Trump administration, and, on this basis, assesses the arguments of its supporters and opponents. The study reveals that calls for re-evaluating the U.S. role in the international system, including cost-benefit analysis of maintaining the existing order, predate Trump’s presidency. These concerns rather stem from the exhaustion of the unipolar moment and the deepening crisis of liberal global governance models and the Western ideological universalism that effectively underpinned the ‘rules-based order’ concept. In this regard, Trump’s prioritization of national interests over liberal internationalism is quite explicable. However, the unpredictability, penchant for theatricality, and policy inconsistencies that have already marked D. Trump’s tenure generate additional challenges and uncertainties both for Washington’s allies and, especially, for those countries that the U.S. leaders label ‘revisionists’. In this context, the author emphasizes that Trump’s ‘nationalization’ and ‘deglobalization’ of U.S. foreign and economic strategy imply not isolationism or renunciation of global ambitions, but rather a deliberate attempt to replace liberal internationalism with a framework where the United States could operate on a strictly unilateralist basis.

The concept of the ‘rules-based international order’ has been actively promoted in recent years within the official and expert discourse of the United States and its allies as a full-fledged alternative to the traditional principles of international relations, i.e. state sovereignty and non-interference. Predictably, this narrative has encountered severe criticism from the leading states of the non-Western world, namely, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which consistently advocate the universally recognized norms of international law guided by principles enshrined in the UN Charter. At the same time, there is by no means a consensus in Western academic literature regarding the ‘rules-based order,’ let alone its full acceptance. In this context, this article identifies the main approaches toward the ‘rules-based order’ conceptualization in contemporary international studies abroad. The author shows that while its advocates resort to rather utopian arguments, claiming that it implies collective decision-making and the establishment of an open and sound universal system through which all states and peoples could peacefully and mutually resolve emerging disputes, the arguments of its critics appear more empirically grounded. Primarily, these critics rightly point to the absence of a universal consensus regarding the content of the ‘rules’ and their compliance procedures, which creates unlimited opportunities for their selective and politically biased application. In this context, the author concludes that a critical analysis of the ‘rules-based order’ concept cannot be reduced to examining its theoretical and legal aspects but should also necessarily include an analysis of its specific political connotations and features of application in international relations.

The end of the Cold War instilled confidence in a significant part of Western political and academic elites that the beginning of the 21st century would be marked by a radical transformation of the entire structure of world politics, including the entire international security agenda. These expectations were largelyembodied in the theory of securitization, which became one of the most dynamic research areas in the theory of international security. However, these expectations were not to be fulfilled: the number of international conflicts continued to grow, which, in turn, could not but call into question the basic tenets of securitization theory. This article focuses on the political ethics underlying securitization theory and the normative approaches to solving modern security problems advanced by its proponents. The author argues that the existing normative approaches in securitization theory can be divided into three research strands: deontological, universalist, and pragmatic, each with a number of distinctive features. Within the framework of deontological approach, developed in the works of the founders of securitization theory and their followers, desecuritization is considered the preferred moral-political strategy. The universalist approach seeks to create universal and generally accepted criteria for the normative evaluation of security practices. Finally, the pragmatic approach prioritizes practical knowledge about security’s value and ethics in its local manifestations and contexts. The author concludes that the formation of these approaches was intrinsically linked to the surrounding historical-political context. At the same time, all these approaches provide only a one-sided interpretation of securitization, marked by Westerncentrism, or, conversely, lack clear ethical guidelines. The author argues that although international security studies still hold potential, the very concept of security is limiting the possibilities for a development of a sustainable positive agenda in international relations. In this regard, turning to other concepts that could contribute to the formation of a more harmonious multipolar world seems useful.

Against the backdrop of rising anti-French sentiments in the Sahel region, debates have intensified within both Russian and foreign scholars regarding the reasons for the apparent crisis, if not the failure, of the Fifth Republic’s African policy. At the same time, these discussions tend to ignore the concept of theso-called ‘security-development nexus’, which, meanwhile, was one of the key determinants shaping France’s approaches to the Sahel countries. An examination of the French experts’ understanding of this construct is particularly interesting because it reveals the specifics and principles of the conceptual-theoretical framework underlying France’s foreign policy toward African countries in general. The first section assesses the French public administration system on the African track and describes the institutional organization of national expertise on security and development issues in Africa, including identifying the affiliations of its most prominent representatives. The author notes that these think tanks and individual researchers are subject to French state authorities’ significant influence or even direct patronage. The second section examines the complex process of the adaptation of French research circles to the securitization of the international development agenda in the 2000s, as they were initially highly skeptical toward the discourse on ‘fragile’ states and the ‘nexus’ concept, borne of the Anglo-Saxon political thought. The third section analyzes the internalization and instrumentalization of the ‘nexus’ in France’s African policy and in French academic discourse against the backdrop of the escalating crisis in the Sahel region in the 2010s. The author emphasizes that the expert debates related to this process focused on solving two tasks: identifying the internal and external causes of the Sahel crisis and formulating practical recommendations for the French government on how to resolve it. The fourth section considers how French experts assess the outcomes of France’s military presence in the Sahel. In conclusion, the author argues that the crisis of the ‘Françafrique’ policy was caused by both objective reasons ‘on the ground’ (the lack of a coherent exit strategy from armed conflicts, the predominance of security considerations over the development agenda) and by hampered feedback between the state and expert circles.

In recent years, amid the increasing polarization in American society, the United States has witnessed growing divergences between its key parties on virtually all domestic and foreign policy issues. However, this trend has barely affected U.S. space exploration programs, indicating a degree of continuity between administrations in this area and demonstrating a political consensus regarding its strategic importance, despite some minor interparty differences. To showcase this trend, this article compares the approaches to space policy during the terms of the Republican D. Trump and the Democrat J. Biden The first section examines their initiatives in this field within the context of the traditional narratives of the so-called ‘grand strategy’, such as the ‘American Dream’, ‘exceptionalism’, the ‘frontier’. The second section traces the continuity between D. Trump’s first term and the Biden administration in such areas of space policy as the exploration of the Moon and Mars, airspace traffic regulation, public-private partnership, and asteroid exploration. At the same time, the author indicates new features in the Biden administration’s approaches to the establishment of the U.S. Space Force, outer space demilitarization, and sectoral program implementation to combat climate change and achieve racial and gender diversity. The third section outlines the contours of D. Trump’s second administration’s new space policy. The author concludes that it is the U.S. self-identification as the sole superpower that has a decisive influence on the formation, coherence, and goal-setting of contemporary American space policy, which explains the phenomenon of strategic continuity between different administrations.

Amid the intensified confrontation between Russia and the so-called collective West, fostering constructive dialogue with Latin American civil society and political elites has acquired particular significance in terms of advancing Russia’sforeign policy interests and shaping its positive image among the nations of the Global Majority. This article identifies the specific features of how key Russian public diplomacy institutions have operated in Latin America since the launch of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and assesses the prospects for their development given the current international situation. The first section highlights the role of international broadcasting in conveying Russia’s foreign policy stance to target audiences in the region. In this regard, the author shows that the activities of Russian overseas diplomatic institutions are no less important than those of the media — ‘RT en Español’, ‘Sputnik Mundo’, and ‘Sputnik Brazil’. The second section examines the role of cultural diplomacy in advancing Russian interests in Latin America. The author concludes that Rossotrudnichestvo plays the most important role in this regard, offering a broad range of creative initiatives aimed at fostering closer cultural ties between the peoples of Russia and Latin America. It is also noted that certain cultural diplomacy actors, such as Russian Houses and diplomatic missions, the Gorchakov Foundation, and the Institute of Latin America, demonstrate a high degree of coordination in foreign policy efforts through organizing joint events. The third section examines the constraints and opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of Russia’s public diplomacy in the region. The former include restrictive measures by the United States and its allies, as well as a persistently high level of critical sentiment towards Russia in a number of Latin American states. The latter include the policy of the Trump administration, which fuels anti-American sentiments in some countries, and, most importantly, contributes to the growing demand among the peoples of Latin America for a more fair and sustainable world order. The author concludes that Russian public diplomacy in the region possesses significant, yet largely untapped, potential. To unleash it, it is necessary to pay more attention to digital diplomacy tools and expand the range and scope of cultural diplomacy programs.

In recent years, Russian historiography on the colonial policies of the great powers during the interwar period has actively studied the strategy of the British Empire to preserve and strengthen control over dependent territories. The new monograph by S.G. Malkin, ‘Policing the Empire: Colonial control and the Britishmilitary thought during the Interbellum’, serves as a good example of this trend. The book provides a detailed analysis of the concepts for adapting the British colonial system to post-war realities. At the same time, the author notes that despite drawing on extensive literature and a broad source base, the monograph is rather a series of essays that do not claim to provide a comprehensive coverage of the subject. Nevertheless, the reviewer argues that the author managed not only to challenge the thesis, common to both the Russian and foreign historiography, about the effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s imperial policy after World War I, but also to formulate non-trivial thought-provoking conclusions on the theoretical and practical aspects of British colonial governance. Thus, reflecting on the military-theoretical foundations of British colonial policy in the interwar period, the author counterintuitively concludes that at the time the United Kingdom’s grand strategy was influenced by the ideas of C. von Clausewitz, despite the skeptical attitude of British politicians towards the latter. From a practical perspective, the author draws attention to the fact that Great Britain actively implemented counterinsurgency tactics and techniques in the fight against national liberation movements to preserve the imperial colonial system. The reviewer argues that the discourse analysis of doctrines and concepts aimed at consolidating the British colonial empire, carried out in the monograph, makes a significant contribution to Russian historiography on the issue and may be of interest to a wide range of readers, including academic researchers.